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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
POSSESSION OF ROCKY MOUNTAIN 
STATE BANK BY THE COMMISSIONER 
OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 880345 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND CASE HISTORY 
Jurisdiction lies with this Court pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §78-2-2(3) (i) (Supp. 1988). This appeal is taken from the 
final order entered by the Third Judicial District Court of Salt 
Lake County, The Honorable J. Dennis Frederick presiding, 
affirming the denial of Fire Insurance Exchanged claim against 
Rocky Mountain State Bank, and the order of said court denying 
Fire Insurance Exchange relief from the stay imposed against all 
litigation involving Rocky Mountain State Bank. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court commit reversible error in 
refusing to lift the stay entered in the instant action insofar as 
it affects Supreme Court Appeal No. 870252, and in affirming the 
denial of appellant's claim by the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation? 
2. Does the Utah Financial Institutions Act, Utah Code 
Ann. §7-2-1 et seq., as applied, violate appellantfs constitutional 
guarantees of due process and access to the courts? 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES 
United States Const., Amend. V and XIV; Utah Const. Art. 
1 §§7 and 11; Utah Code Ann. §7-2-1 et seq. Due to the length of 
these provisions, the text of each is set forth in the addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The controversy in the instant appeal arises originally 
out of the collapse of an earth-covered home located in North Salt 
Lake, Utah. The home was owned by S. Larry Crookston and Randi L. 
Crookston (hereinafter the "Crookstons"). In December, 1980, the 
Crookstons obtained a nine-month construction loan in the sum of 
$60,000 from Rocky Mountain State Bank (hereinafter the "Bank") 
for the purpose of constructing an "earth home." In conjunction 
with the original construction loan, the Crookstons executed a 
promissory note and delivered a trust deed to the real property to 
the Bank as security for the loan. (R. at 144-45) 
Pursuant to the Bank's loan requirements, the Crookstons 
on December 4, 1980 obtained a policy of insurance, Policy No. 
F60760092, from Fire Insurance Exchange. The Bank was listed on 
the policy as the loss payee in the event of an insured loss. (R. 
at 144-47) 
Construction on the residence took much longer than 
expected. Substantial amounts of work remained to be done on the 
structure at the time the original construction loan matured in 
September, 1981. The Bank initially refused to extend the loan 
period until the Crookstons deposited approximately $12,000 with 
the Bank. Once the Crookstons delivered $12,000 to the Bank, a 
90-day loan extension was granted. The extension was due to 
expire in mid-December, 1981. (R. at 144-45) 
On December 2, 1981, the earth home collapsed while dirt 
was being placed on top of the structure by a subcontractor. The 
Crookstons notified Fire Insurance Exchange through their 
insurance agent of the home's collapse. Due to the unique nature 
of the damaged home, Fire Insurance Exchange and other interested 
parties, including the Bank, had difficulty finding contractors 
willing to give repair estimates on the loss. Within a short time 
of the home's collapse, the Bank began pressuring Fire Insurance 
Exchange for prompt payment of the claim. The home remained in 
its damaged state for several months, without the parties ever 
agreeing on a mutually acceptable adjustment of the loss. (R. at 
145-47) 
On the afternoon of June 16, 1982, Alan Clapperton of 
Fire Insurance Exchange met with a representative of Rocky 
Mountain State Bank about the loss. At that meeting, the Bank 
offered and agreed to settle its claim against Fire Insurance 
Exchange in consideration for a draft slightly in excess of 
$32,000, payable solely to Rocky Mountain State Bank. (R. at 147) 
At the time of the settlement between Fire Insurance 
Exchange and the Bank, the Bank had approximately $42,000 availa-
ble in undisbursed funds in the Crookstons1 loan account. Such 
funds were conceivably available to the Crookstons to rebuild 
their home. Despite the Crookstons1 fervent desire to rebuild 
their home, the Bank expressed great reluctance about financing 
another earth home. Due to the Bank's refusal to allow the use of 
such funds, the Crookstons were unable to rebuild their home. (R. 
at 147-48) 
When the Crookstons learned of the settlement between 
Fire Insurance Exchange and the Bank, the Crookstons consulted 
their attorney to discuss possible alternatives. The Crookstons 
initially considered filing suit against Fire Insurance Exchange, 
but opted to file for personal bankruptcy. When Rocky Mountain 
State Bank received notice that the Crookstons had filed for 
bankruptcy, the Bank took steps to foreclose on the property. The 
Crookstons subsequently quit-claimed their property to the Bank in 
lieu of foreclosure. (R. at 148) 
On or about February 10, 1983, the Crookstons filed suit 
against Fire Insurance Exchange and Rocky Mountain State Bank, 
Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange, et al., Third Judicial 
District Court, C83-1030. The Crookstons alleged that the actions 
of Fire Insurance Exchange and the Bank caused them emotional dis-
tress and financial ruin. The Crookstons also claimed that Fire 
Insurance Exchange and the Bank, individually and in concert, had 
acted in bad faith and had defrauded them. (See Supreme Court 
Appeal No. 880034, R. at 9-10) 
Fire Insurance Exchange cross-claimed against the Bank, 
claiming a right of contribution and indemnity. The Bank in turn 
cross-claimed against Fire Insurance Exchange, also claiming a 
right to contribution. (See Supreme Court Appeal No. 880034, R. 
at 64-67, 917-22) 
On March 27, 1987, the trial court ordered that the trial 
date of May 26, 1987, which had been originally set by the 
Honorable David B. Dee, would remain in effect. (See Supreme 
Court Appeal No. 880034, R. at 1063-65) 
On the afternoon of Friday, May 22, 1987, counsel for the 
Bank advised counsel for Fire Insurance Exchange by telephone that 
the Bank intended to file a motion for summary judgment. The 
motion and supporting memorandum were not personally served upon 
counsel for Fire Insurance Exchange until approximately 9:00 p.m. 
on Friday, May 22, 1987. That same day, counsel for the Bank 
advised the court and other counsel by letter of their intention 
to have a motion for summary judgment "directed to the cross-claim 
of Fire Insurance Exchange against Rocky Mountain State Bank 
seeking contribution and indemnity" heard on the very next busi-
ness day, Tuesday, May 26, 1987, the same day the trial was set to 
begin. Monday, May 25, 1987, was Memorial Day, a court holiday. 
No formal notice of hearing was ever filed in conjunction with the 
Bank's motion for summary judgment. (See Supreme Court Appeal No. 
880034, R. at 1241-42, 1250-52, 3003) 
On Tuesday, May 26, 1987, at the hour of 9:00 a.m., 
approximately one hour prior to the scheduled commencement of 
trial, the trial court heard argument on the Bank's motion for 
summary judgment. Fire Insurance Exchange objected to the lack of 
adequate notice of a hearing and the untimeliness of the motion. 
(See Supreme Court Appeal No. 880034, R. at 1538-40, 2995-3013) 
Following brief argument, the court granted the Bank's 
motion for summary judgment, dismissing Fire Insurance Exchange's 
claims of contribution and indemnity against the Bank. Fire 
Insurance Exchange then moved for a continuance to permit it to 
file a third-party complaint against the Bank. The trial court 
refused to grant the requested continuance. (See Supreme Court 
Appeal No. 880034, R. at 1257, 1538-40, 3008) 
The matter went to trial in the absence of the Bank. 
Following a 6-day trial, the jury returned a verdict in excess of 
$4.8 million against Fire Insurance Exchange on claims of fraud 
and misrepresentation, intentional infliction of emotional 
distress, breach of contract, and breach of the covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing. An appeal from the jury's verdict and the 
trial court's subsequent denial of various post-trial motions is 
currently pending before this Court, Utah Supreme Court Appeal 
No. 880034. 
On June 9, 1987, the trial court entered its order, 
granting Rocky Mountain State Bank's motion for summary judgment, 
dismissing with prejudice the cross-claim of Fire Insurance 
Exchange against the Bank. The order was certified as final under 
Rule 54(b), U.R.C.P. (R. at 124) 
On or about July 2, 1987, Fire Insurance Exchange 
appealed to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah from the June 
9, 1987 final judgment of the Third Judicial District Court, 
granting summary judgment on Fire Insurance Exchange's cross-claim 
in favor of Rocky Mountain State Bank. (R. at 124) Over the 
course of the next several months, appellate counsel for Fire 
Insurance Exchange continued to have regular contact with counsel 
for Rocky Mountain State Bank. 
On August 28, 1987, unbeknown to Fire Insurance Exchange, 
George Sutton, the Commissioner of Financial Institutions of the 
State of Utah, petitioned the Third Judicial District Court for an 
order authorizing him to take possession of the Bank. (R. at 2-7) 
That same day, the Court ordered the Commissioner to take immedi-
ate possession of the Bank. (R. at 8-12) The Court's order also 
authorized the Commissioner to appoint a liquidator or receiver 
for the Bank. Pursuant to the order, the Commissioner appointed 
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC") as receiver or 
liquidator. The order also stayed all judicial proceedings 
against the Bank. (R. at 11) 
On or about January 19, 1988, Fire Insurance Exchange 
filed its brief in the appeal arising from the trial court's last 
minute granting of summary judgment in favor of the bank, Supreme 
Court Appeal No. 870252. (R. at 125) 
Not until on or about February 25, 1988, did counsel for 
Rocky Mountain State Bank inform counsel for Fire Insurance 
Exchange that a stay against all proceedings involving the Bank 
had been entered in In the Matter of the Possession of Rocky 
Mountain State Bank by the Commissioner of Financial Institutions, 
Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, C87-5743. (See 
Notice of Stay, Supreme Court Appeal No. 870252.) As a result of 
the notice of stay, Supreme Court Appeal No. 870252 has been 
indefinitely stayed. 
On or about March 9, 1988, Fire Insurance Exchange moved 
the trial court for an order to lift the stay entered in the 
instant case insofar as the stay affected Supreme Court Appeal 
No. 870252. (R. at 115-16) Fire Insurance Exchange's motion was 
opposed by counsel for Rocky Mountain State Bank, the FDIC, and 
United Pacific Insurance Company, the Bank's liability insurer. 
(R. at 588) On or about May 16, 1988, the Honorable J. Dennis 
Frederick denied Fire Insurance Exchange's motion to lift the stay 
insofar as the stay affected other appeals currently pending. (R. 
at 211) 
On or about May 31, 1988, Fire Insurance Exchange 
appealed to the Utah Supreme Court from the May 16, 1988 order of 
the Third Judicial District Court denying Fire Insurance 
Exchange's motion to lift the stay. (R. at 46 2; see also, Supreme 
Court Appeal No. 88022 3) Fire Insurance Exchange's appeal from 
the denial of the motion to lift stay was dismissed by the Utah 
Supreme Court as being premature. (R. at 549) 
On or about May 16, 1988, Fire Insurance Exchange filed 
a proof of claim with counsel for the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation and the Utah Department of Financial Institutions 
outlining Fire Insurance Exchange's claims against Rocky Mountain 
State Bank. (R. at 206-07) 
On or about July 20, 1988, the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation gave Fire Insurance Exchange notice that its proof of 
claim had been denied by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
as receiver of Rocky Mountain State Bank. (R. at 539-43) On or 
about August 11, 1988, the Third Judicial District Court of Salt 
Lake County, the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick presiding, affirmed 
the denial of the claims of Fire Insurance Exchange against Rocky 
Mountain State Bank by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
as receiver of the bank. (R. at 547-48) 
On or about September 2, 1988, Fire Insurance Exchange 
brought the instant appeal seeking reversal of the order of Judge 
Frederick affirming the denial of the claims of Fire Insurance 
Exchange against Rocky Mountain State Bank, and Judge Frederick's 
previous order denying Fire Insurance Exchange's motion to lift 
the stay which was entered in the instant matter insofar as the 
stay affects other pending appeals. (R. at 551-52) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in failing to find that Fire 
Insurance Exchange had established good cause for lifting the stay 
that had been entered in the instant case. The trial court had 
sufficient evidence to find that Fire Insurance Exchange had a 
right of contribution against the Bank and a vested right to 
require the Bank to remain a party to the trial in the related 
underlying action. Furthermore, good cause existed for lifting 
the stay due to the Bank's failure to promptly notify Fire 
Insurance Exchange of the stay and the prejudice that Fire 
Insurance Exchange would suffer if the stay remains in place. 
The Utah Financial Institutions Act, Utah Code Ann. 
§7-2-1 et seq., as applied in this case by the trial court denies 
Fire Insurance Exchange's constitutional rights to due process and 
access to the courts. Federal and state constitutional provisions 
require that Fire Insurance Exchange be permitted to pursue the 
appeal it previously perfected against the Bank in Supreme Court 
Appeal No. 870252. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
GOOD CAUSE EXISTED FOR LIFTING A STAY THAT 
PREVENTED JUDICIAL REVIEW OF A CLEARLY 
ILL-TIMED AND ERRONEOUS RULING BY THE 
TRIAL COURT. 
Fire Insurance Exchange respectfully submits that the 
trial court committed reversible error in refusing to lift the 
stay entered in the instant action insofar as the stay affects 
Supreme Court Appeal No. 870252. Utah Code Ann. §7-2-7(1) (1953) 
provides that a stay entered pursuant to the Financial Institutions 
Act, Utah Code Ann. §7-2-1 et seq., may be lifted, "upon applica-
tion and after notice and hearing . . . for cause shown." Fire 
Insurance Exchange asserts that it established sufficient good 
cause to require the trial court to lift or otherwise modify the 
stay so as to permit Appeal No. 870252 to progress against Rocky 
Mountain State Bank. 
Appeal No. 870252 involves at least two critical 
procedural and substantive issues: 
1. Did the trial court commit reversible 
error and deny Fire Insurance Exchange's 
right to due process by hearing and 
granting Rocky Mountain State Bankrs 
motion for summary judgment without 
affording Fire Insurance Exchange addi-
tional time to respond to the motion? 
2. Did the trial court err in finding that 
Fire Insurance Exchange had no right or 
claim of contribution against Rocky 
Mountain State Bank? 
The stay that was entered by the trial court against Appeal No. 
870252 has effectively denied Fire Insurance Exchange its right to 
have several of the trial court's rulings in the related underly-
ing action, Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchange, et al., reviewed by 
an appellate court. While Rocky Mountain State Bank enjoys the 
safe harbor created by the stay, Fire Insurance Exchange 
potentially remains singularly liable for a judgment in excess of 
$4.8 million. 
Fire Insurance Exchange, in seeking to have the stay 
lifted below, represented to the court that its research 
demonstrated that the court's ruling was in error on a critical 
substantive issue, i.e., whether contribution exists between 
intentional tortfeasors. (R. at 588) The trial court should have 
found good cause to lift the stay in the instant action due to the 
trial court's clear reversible error in granting summary judgment 
in favor of Rocky Mountain State Bank on the morning of trial. 
A. Fire Insurance Exchange Had a Right of Contribution. 
At common law there was no contribution among joint 
tortfeasors. Merryweather v. Nixon, 8 Term. Rep. 186, 101 Eng. 
Rep. 1337 (1799). See also, Restatement of Restitution §102 
(1936). Utah, as well as many other jurisdictions, adhered to the 
common law rule until the legislature abrogated the prohibition 
against contribution. The legislature's enactment of Utah Code 
Ann. §78-27-39 in 1973 absolished the common law rule on 
contribution in the State of Utah. See Krukiewicz v. Draper, 
725 P.2d 1349, 1351 (Utah 1986). Section 78-27-39 of the Utah 
Code, now repealed, provides for contribution among joint 
tortfeasors: 
(1) The right of contribution shall 
exist among joint tort-feasors, but a joint 
tort-feasor shall not be entitled to money 
judgment for contribution until he has, by 
payment, discharged the common liability or 
more than his pro rata share thereof. 
Section 78-27-40(3) of the Utah Code defines "joint tort-
feasor" as follows: 
As used in this action, "joint tort-feasor" 
means one of two or more persons, jointly or 
severally liable in tort for the same injury 
to person or property, whether or not judgment 
has been recovered against all or some of them. 
The determination of whether defendant Fire Insurance 
Exchange has a right of contribution against the Bank turns not on 
what might have been the rule at common law, but whether such a 
right exists under §§78-27-39 and 78-27-40, now repealed, of the 
Utah Code. In determining whether such a statutory right exists, a 
well-established rule of statutory construction, Utah Code Ann. 
§68-3-2 (1953), controls: 
The rule of the common law that statutes in 
derogation thereof are to be strictly construed 
has no application to the statutes of this state. 
The statutes establish the laws of this state 
respecting the subjects to which they relate, 
and their provisions and all proceedings under 
them are to be liberally construed with a view 
to effect the object of the statutes and to 
promote justice. Whenever there is any variance 
between the rules of equity and the rules of 
common law in reference to the same matter 
the rules of equity shall prevail. (Emphasis 
added) 
The Utah Supreme Court in Krukiewicz v. Draper, 725 P.2d 
1349 (Utah 1986), had occasion to determine whether a defendant 
was a "joint tortfeasor" as that term is defined by Utah Code Ann. 
§78-27-40(3) (repealed 1986). In Krukiewicz, the plaintiffs were 
injured in a collision with an automobile driven by defendant 
Holm. At the time of the accident, Holm was acting in the course 
of his employment by defendant Draper. Pursuant to a settlement 
agreement, Holm paid the plaintiffs $40,000, and the plaintiffs 
released Holm from further liability, but expresssly reserved all 
rights against Draper. Subsequently, plaintiffs sued Draper. 
Draper then moved for summary judgment. The trial court held that 
the plaintiffs release of Holm also released Draper from liability 
as a matter of law, and plaintiffs appealed. 
On appeal, the court was asked to determine whether a 
master in the context of a master-servant relationship is a "joint 
tortfeasor" under Utah Code Ann. §78-27-40(3), now repealed. The 
court, noting the origin of the Utah statutes abrogating the common 
law prohibition against contribution, stated: 
The background of §78-27-42, enacted in 
197 3 as part of the Utah Comparative 
Negligence Act, §§78-27-39 to -43, indicates 
that it was designed to reverse the common 
law rule. It was patterned after the 
Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, 
first promulgated by the National Conference 
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 
1939. 
Id. at 1351 (emphasis added). 
The Utah Supreme Court in Krukiewicz looked to the 
decisions of other jurisdictions with statutes patterned after the 
19 39 version of the Uniform Act to determine whether a master is a 
"joint tortfeasor" under the Utah contribution statute. The 
Court, citing with approval the decision in Blackshear v. Clark, 
391 A.2d 747, 748 (Del. 1978), stated: 
The Delaware Supreme Court, in discussing why 
the 19 39 Uniform Actfs definition of joint 
tortfeasor included the master-servant relation-
ship, stated: 
The basis of liability is not relevant, 
nor is the relationship among those 
liable for the tort. In short, it makes 
no difference whether the [master's] 
liability is based upon the doctrine of 
respondeat superior or any other legal 
concept. The point is that both it and 
the [servant] are (at least) "severally" 
liable for the same injury to plaintiff. 
Therefore the Uniform Contribution Among 
Tort-feasors Act applies. We so hold. 
Id. at 1351-52 (emphasis added). 
The Utah Supreme Court reversed and remanded the matter, 
holding that the defendant employer was a "joint tortfeasor" since 
he was severally liable with his servant for the same indivisible 
injury to the plaintiff. Id. 
Similarly, the Court in Cruz v. Montoya, 660 P.2d 723 
(Utah 1983), noted that the right to contribution is not limited 
under Utah law to actions sounding solely in negligence. Cruz 
arose from an incident in a Salt Lake City cafe where Mr. Cruz 
sustained personal injuries as a result of a fight with Val 
Montoya and Mike Montoya. Cruz brought suit against the Montoyas. 
The jury awarded a verdict against Val Montoya in excess of 
$21,000. The trial court directed a verdict in favor of Mike 
Montoya because the plaintiff had failed to prove a prima facie 
case against him. Several other defendants were not present at 
the trial. 
On appeal, Val Montoya contended that he was unfairly 
required to answer for the acts of all the defendants and not just 
his own. Montoya also contended that he was being forced to bear 
a disproportionate amount of the damages because all of the 
defendants were not similarly brought to trial. The Utah Supreme 
Court rejected his arguments by stating: 
This statute [Utah Code Annotated §78-27-40(2)] 
applies to joint tortfeasors1 rights of con-
tribution. It does not support Val?s argument 
nor mandate that the plaintiff must obtain 
jurisdiction over all the tortfeasors and 
bring them to trial so that the proportion 
of fault of each may be there determined. 
Further, the manner in which the Montoyas were 
brought to trial does not diminish the damage 
[Cruz] suffered or Valfs participation in and 
liability for the assault. With respect to 
general and special damages, [Cruz] concedes 
that the maximum amount that he can collect 
from all of the defendants is $9,000 general 
damages and $869.80 special damages. If these 
amounts are paid by Val, he is not precluded 
from exercising his right to seek contribution 
from the other Montoyas. 
Id. at 727-28 (emphasis added). 
As already noted, the Utah contribution statute was 
patterned after the 1939 Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors 
Act. Krukiewicz, 725 P. 2d at 1351. Other jurisdictions still 
retaining the substance of the original Uniform Act of 19 39 
include: Arkansas, Delaware, Hawaii, Maryland, Mississippi, New 
Jersey, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and South Dakota. 
12 Uniform Laws Ann. 62 (1975). A review of the history 
surrounding the promulgation of the 19 39 Act, as well as an 
analysis of cases arising in jurisdictions with contribution 
statutes patterned after the 19 39 Act provide persuasive evidence 
that intentional tortfeasors have a right of contribution under 
Utah law. See Jensen v. Intermountain Health Care, 679 P.2d 903 
(Utah 1984) (construction placed on similar statute by sister 
states is a valuable aid in determining legislative intent); and 
Valley National Bank v. Avco Development Co., 14 Ariz.App. 56, 480 
P.2d 671 (1971) (comments of Commission on Uniform State Laws are 
highly persuasive and should be adopted unless contrary to the 
settled policy of a state). 
Due to the existence of numerous variations and 
exceptions to the common law rule prohibiting contribution, the 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
recommended the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act in 
19 39. The pertinent sections of the 19 39 Act are as follows: 
Section 1. For the purposes of this Act the 
term joint tortfeasors means two or more 
persons jointly or severally liable in tort for 
the same injury to persons or property, whether 
or not judgment has been recovered against all 
or some of them. 
Section 2. (1) The right of contribution exists 
among joint tortfeasors; (2) A joint tort-
feasor is not entitled to a money judgment for 
contribution until he has by payment discharged 
the common liability or has paid more than his 
pro-rata share thereof. 
12 Uniform Laws Ann- 57 (1975). 
It should be noted that the 19 39 Act itself makes no 
distinction between intentional tortfeasors and those who are 
merely negligent. In fact, the commissioners purposely omitted 
any distinction. The Act was to apply to all joint tortfeasors, 
regardless of the theory or basis of their liability. In 
commenting upon the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act of 
19 39, the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws state: 
This subsection creates the right of contri-
bution among joint tortfeasors. It does not, 
in any way, qualify the creation of this right 
by confining it to joint tortfeasors in any 
narrower sense than that indicated in section 1. 
Nor does it confine contribution to merely 
negligent tortfeasors or to those in any way 
inadvertently harming others. It permits con-
tribution among all tortfeasors whom the injured 
person could hold liable for the same damage or 
injury to his person or property. 
1938 Handbook of the National Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws, p. 393 (emphasis added). See also, 1939 
Handbook of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
State Laws, p. 136 et seq; Contribution - Willful Tortfeasors -
Common Law and Under Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, 
62 Dick. L. Rev. 262, 264 (1957-58); and F. Harper and F. James, 
The Law of Torts, §10.2 at 722 (1956). 
Those jurisdictions which have patterned their 
contribution statutes after the 19 39 version of the Uniform 
Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act generally hold that intentional 
tortfeasors have a right of contribution. In Judson v. Peoples 
Bank and Trust Co., 17 N.J. 67, 110 A.2d 24 (1954), the New Jersey 
court held that intentional tortfeasors have a right to 
contribution. In Judson, the plaintiffs brought suit against five 
defendants for fraudulently conspiring to oust the plaintiffs from 
control of a corporation by inducing them to part with their stock 
at an unconscionable price. Plaintiffs accepted $2,500 from two 
of the defendants, Peoples Bank and Trust Company and from a Mr. 
Smith, an officer of Peoples Bank. Summary judgments were 
thereafter entered in favor of the remaining defendants, and 
plaintiff appealed. 
On appeal, the New Jersey Supreme Court, with Judge 
William J. Brennan, Jr., authoring the majority opinion, held that 
the summary judgments were improvidently granted since genuine 
issues of material facts existed. The court went on to address 
whether the New Jersey contribution statute, patterned after the 
Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act of 19 39, establishes a 
right of contribution among intentional tortfeasors. The court 
noted that over time the traditional common-law prohibition 
against contribution had given way to a number of judicially 
created exceptions permitting contribution under limited 
circumstances. Speaking of these exceptions, and the effect of 
the New Jersey contribution statute on the common law rule, the 
court stated: 
These judicially created common-law and 
equitable principles are, of course, vulnerable 
to extinction or modification at the hands of 
the Legislature, the ultimate arbiter of public 
policy. Our problem is whether the Legislature 
in enacting the Contribution Law of 1952 adopted 
the policy of allowing contribution not only 
among unintentional co-tortfeasors but even 
among intentional including fraudulent joint 
wrongdoers. If the Legislature has enacted 
the broader right, our judicial function is to 
declare it however we may deplore the necessity 
of lending the aid of the courts to suitors 
guilty of intentional wrongdoing. 
The framers of the draft uniform act made clear 
the recommendation that Sections 1 and 2(1) of 
the draft act embraced the creation of a right 
of contribution among tortfeasors without regard 
to whether the tort for which the liability 
arose was intentionally or unintentionally 
inflicted. Section 1 provides that "for the 
purpose of this act the term 'joint tortfeasors1 
means two or more persons jointly or severally 
liable in tort for the same injury to person 
or property, whether or not judgment has been 
recovered against all or some of them." 
Section 2(1) provides, "the right of contribu-
tion exists among joint tortfeasors." That 
the inclusiveness of all torts implicit in 
this wording is intended is confirmed by the 
commissioner's note dealing with the 
sections . . . . 
* * * 
The legislative history prior to the enactment 
of our act of 1952 buttresses the conclusion 
that our Legislature adopted the provisions of 
the draft act in this regard to effect the 
comprehensive coverage recommended by the 
framers of the draft act. Assembly bills 
introduced in 1949, 1950 and 1951, as bills 
numbered 104, 267 and 242 for the respective 
years, would have limited contribution to 
tortfeasors guilty of negligence, and all 
failed of passage. 
* * * 
The more reasonable interpretation [of the New 
Jersey contribution statutes] leave[s] no doubt 
that all torts of commission and omission were 
within the ambit of the law. 
Judson, 110 A.2d at 34-36 (emphasis added). 
Likewise, the court in McLean v. Alexander, 449 F.Supp. 
1251 (D. Del. 1978), rev' d on other grounds, 599 F.2d 1190 (3d 
Cir. 1979), held that the Delaware contribution statute, also 
patterned after the 19 39 Uniform Act, affords an intentional 
tortfeasor the right of contribution. The plaintiff in McLean 
brought suit after purchasing stock in reliance on a misleading 
report prepared by an accountant. The accountant cross-claimed 
for indemnification and contribution against various other 
defendants who were parties to the stock transaction. The 
plaintiff contended that the defendant accountant was not entitled 
to contribution, since such a right was limited to liability 
arising solely out of negligence. The federal district court 
rejected the plaintiff's position by applying Delaware law: 
In contrast to federal right for contribution, 
there is ample guidance with respect to the 
state claim. Defendant's cross-claim for 
contribution based on the finding of common 
law fraud must be resolved on the basis of 
the Delaware statute which permits apportion-
ment by comparative fault. Delaware was one 
of the first states to adopt the 19 39 Uniform 
Joint Tortfeasors Act providing that: 
When there is such a disproportion of 
fault among joint tortfeasors as to 
render an equitable and equal distribu-
tion among them of the common liability 
by contribution, the relative degrees of 
fault of the joint tortfeasors shall be 
considered in determining the pro rata 
shares. 10 Del. C. §6302(d). 
Although plaintiff argues that the statute is 
limited to cases of negligence, there is no 
limitation expressed within the terms of the 
statute. Rather, there is evidence that no 
such qualification was intended. Instructive 
are comments to the 1955 version of the Uniform 
Joint Tortfeasors Act noting that Delaware by 
adoption of the 19 39 Act applies the principle 
of relative culpability to non-intentional and 
intentional torts. Commentators writing at the 
time of its passage understood the statute to 
apply to intentional wrongdoing as well as non-
intentional torts agreeing that principles of 
apportionment were inherently more fair in 
either case and therefore basic to a well-
ordered system of loss allocation. Gregory, 
Contribution Among Tortfeasors; A Uniform 
Practice, 1938 Wise. L. Rev. 365, 380. 
* * * 
Finally, plaintiff asserts that the apportionment 
of damages which results in a reduction of 
damages for some defendants will undermine the 
principle of deterrence. This is the same 
argument found to be unpersuasive by the over-
whelming majority of states which now permit 
contribution. Although one defendant's damages 
are reduced, another's are increased; Thus a 
system which holds all wrongdoers liable for 
some damages, the amount of which depends on 
the extent of his involvement, will in all 
likelihood increase deterrence. Under such a 
system, one cannot embark on an unlawful course . 
with the hope or expectation that someone less 
culpable will foot the bill. Thus, vigilance, 
if affected at all, is more likely increased 
than decreased. 
McLean, 449 F.Supp. at 1274-1275 (emphasis added). 
The federal district court in Testa v. Winquist, 451 
F.Supp. 388 (D. R.I. 1978), likewise held that under the Rhode 
Island contribution statute, patterned after the 19 39 Uniform Act, 
an intentional tortfeasor has a right to contribution. In Testa, 
the plaintiffs brought action against several police officers to 
recover for alleged deprivations of their constitutional rights. 
The defendant police officers filed a third-party claim against 
various parties for contribution and indemnity. The court, in 
holding that intentional tortfeasors have a right of contribution 
under Rhode Island law, stated: 
In Rhode Island, contribution is generally 
available between joint tortfeasors for negli-
gent acts that are the concurring causes of 
plaintiff's injury. Third-party defendants 
urge that contribution is only available to 
the non-intentional tortfeasor and, thus, 
third-party plaintiffs charged with false 
arrest, imprisonment and constitutional wrongs 
cannot recover against them for their negligent 
acts. Third-party defendants correctly state 
the rule in some states which have abrogated 
the common law prohibition against contribution 
but still deny the right of contribution to an 
intentional tortfeasor. See generally, 18 Am.Jur. 
2d §§33-40 (1965). However, Rhode Island has 
adopted, without material alteration, the Uniform 
Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act which contains 
no such limitation on the right of contribution 
between joint tortfeasors, nor makes any distinc-
tion between negligent or intentional torts. 
F. Harper and F. James, The Law of Torts, §10.2 
at 722 (1956). The moving party has failed to 
provide any Rhode Island case law suggesting 
such a narrow interpretation of the act, nor 
has this court found any. Of course, inten-
tional conduct is more likely to constitute a 
superseding unforeseeable cause for which the 
initial negligent tortfeasor is not liable. 
But there is no reason to institute a hard and 
fast rule denying contribution to the party who 
commits an intentional tort such as false arrest 
and imp r i s onment. 
Testa, 451 F.Supp. at 392-93 (emphasis added). 
The court in Boyles v. Hyder, 22 B.R. 851 (N.D. Tex. 
1982), held that under Texas law intentional tortfeasors also have 
a right of contribution. The Texas court stated: 
The Texas statute is broadly worded to allow 
contribution In favor of any tortfeasor. Absent 
a clear mandate by the Texas legislature or 
Texas courts to limit the provisions to uninten-
tional tortfeasors, I will construe the statute 
literally. Also, from a policy standpoint, this 
result is sensible. The common law rule has been 
justified as deterring wrong-doers, but allowing 
one tortfeasor to go scot-free while penalizing 
a joint tortfeasor does little to deter the wrong-
doer who pays nothing. Further, it seems ques-
tionable that the majority of those who conspire, 
commit fraud, and inflict other wrongs inten-
tionally are deterred by a rule they probably 
never consider and indeed do not know until long 
after the intentional wrong is committed. When 
contribution among intentional tortfeasors is 
allowed, all wrong-doers are punished to some 
extent for their actions. Allowing contribution 
in no way prejudices the injured party who 
remains free to seek full satisfaction from any 
one of the tortfeasors. Contribution only affects 
the rights of the wrong-doers among themselves. 
Id. at 854 (emphasis added). 
Other jurisdictions have similarly held under statutes 
comparable to the Utah contribution statute, Utah Code Ann. 
§78-27-39, that intentional tortfeasors have a right of 
contribution. See, Webster Motor Car Co. v. Zell Motor Car Co., 
234 F.2d 616 (4th Cir. 1956) (under Maryland law co-conspirators 
are liable to one another for contribution as joint tortfeasors); 
Shultz v. Young, 205 Ark. 533, 169 S.W.2d 648 (1943) (damages may 
be apportioned among intentional tortfeasors); Schauer v. Joyce, 
54 N.Y.S.2d 1, 429 N.E.2d 83 (1981) (right of contribution applies 
even to intentional tortfeasors); Roma v. Buffalo General Hosp., 
103 A.D.2d 606, 481 N.Y.S.2d 811 (1984) (right of contribution 
arises where intentional tortfeasor is jointly liable for the same 
injury); Helmrich v. Ely Lily and Co., 89 A.D.2d 441, 455 N.Y.S.2d 
460 (1982) (right of contribution arises where plaintiff sues 
each defendant for the same injuries); Taft v. Shaffer Trucking, 
Inc., 52 A.D.2d 255, 383 N.Y.S.2d 744 (1976) (a claim for 
contribution arises when intentional tortfeasors share in the 
responsibility of causing injury); and Taylor v. Kinston Free 
Press Co., 237 N.C. 551, 75 S.E.2d 528 (1953) (cross-complaint for 
contribution between intentional tortfeasors held to state a cause 
of action). 
As the Utah Supreme Court stated in Krukiewicz v. Draper, 
725 P.2d 1349, 1351 (Utah 1986), a joint tortfeasor is defined 
under Utah law in terms of liability, not negligence. Under Utah 
law, a joint tortfeasor is simply "one of two or more persons, 
jointly or severally liable in tort . . . ." Utah Code Ann. 
§78-27-40(3). The particular basis of a defendant's liability to 
a plaintiff is not relevant to the determination of who is a joint 
tortfeasor under Utah law. The sole requirement is that the joint 
tortfeasor be "severally" liable for the same indivisible injury. 
See, Thode, Comparative Negligence, Contribution Among Tortfeasors, 
and the Effect of a Release—A Triple Play by the Utah Legislature, 
1973 Utah L.Rev. 406, 420. See also, Lang v. Gunn, 23 Ala.App. 
574, 129 So. 318, 319 (1930) (where a wrong is jointly 
participated in or contributed to by each defendant, they are 
"joint tort-feasors" and responsible severally for the injury); 
Hollis v. School Board, 384 So.2d 661, 663 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1980) 
(general rule is that persons who combine to commit a wrong are 
"joint tortfeasors"); and Young v. Dille, 127 Wash. 398, 220 P. 
782 (1923) (to be a joint tortfeasor, the parties must either act 
together in committing the wrong, or their acts, if independent of 
each other, must unite in causing a single injury). 
The Utah Legislature's intent that the term "joint 
tortfeasor" include intentional tortfeasors is clearly 
demonstrated by the legislative debates on the contribution 
statute. During debate in the Utah Senate, the question was 
posed by Senator Warren Pugh, "What's a tortfeasor?" One of the 
bill's proponents, Senator Richard Howe, answered: 
He's a person that commits a personal 
wrong, such as someone who negligently 
drives his automobile into you or hits you 
with his fist, someone who inflicts personal 
damage upon you and is wrongful, he's 
called a tortfeasor. 
Utah Senate Floor Records, Utah State Legislature, 197 3 General 
Session, Mar. 8, 1973, Record No. 319. 
Contrary to the trial court's finding in the related 
underlying case, Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange and Rocky 
Mountain State Bank, Utah law does provide Fire Insurance Exchange 
with a right of contribution against the Bank. The trial court's 
ruling was not only substantively incorrect, but also procedurally 
defective. See Addendum, pp. 452 to 46 3 for a thorough examina-
tion of the procedural irregularities associated with the Court's 
ruling. 
The trial judge, Judge Frederick, in the instant case was 
also the trial judge in the related underlying action. Judge 
Frederick has admitted that his ruling on the issue of contribu-
tion between Fire Insurance Exchange and Rocky Mountain State Bank 
may have greatly impacted the outcome of the trial that resulted 
in a $4.8 million verdict against Fire Insurance Exchange: 
Counsel, I recognize had the dismissal of the 
Bank not occurred, that is, had this Court 
ruled that there was indeed contribution . . . 
between intentional tortfeasors, the complexion 
of the trial and the issues submitted to the 
jury may well have been different that they are. 
(R. at 588, at p. 20.) 
In view of the clearly erroneous ruling by the trial 
court in the related underlying action, Fire Insurance Exchange 
demonstrated sufficient good cause to have the stay lifted in the 
instant case insofar as it affects Appeal No. 870252. 
B. Fire Insurance Exchange Had a Right to Require the 
Bank to Remain as a Party Defendant in the Related 
Underlying Action. 
Although there is no Utah case on point, case law in 
other jurisdictions and leading scholarly treatises clearly 
demonstrate that Fire Insurance Exchange had a vested right to 
have Rocky Mountain State Bank remain as a party defendant to Fire 
Insurance Exchange's crossclaim in the trial of the related under-
lying action. The dismissal of Fire Insurance Exchange's 
crossclaim against the Bank deprived Fire Insurance Exchange of 
its right to proceed to trial with the Bank present and to have 
the co-defendeantsf respective liability and proportionate fault 
determined by a single trier of fact. 
Although no Utah court has addressed whether a party has 
a vested right to join a potential co-joint tortfeasor to an 
action prior to the entry and payment of a judgment, a majority of 
jurisdictions with similar procedural rules and substantive laws 
have recognized such a right: 
If the governing substantive law recognizes a 
right of contribution, impleader under Rule 14 
is a proper procedure by which to seek relief 
from joint tortfeasors. The availability of 
impleader enables the right of contribution to 
be litigated concurrently with the main claim. 
Because the question whether someone is a joint 
tortfeasor is largely one of fact to be deter-
mined by the jury, a motion to dismiss the 
third-party complaint on the ground that it 
fails to state a claim normally should be denied 
and the third-party plaintiff allowed an oppor-
tunity to produce evidence as to the nature of 
the relationship. Moreover, it is not critical 
that state substantive law does not recognize 
a right to contribution until the original defen-
dant has paid more than his pro rata share. Any 
judgment on the third-party claim does not 
become enforceable until after the common lia-
bility has been discharged by the original 
defendant. Impleader under Rule 14 merely 
accelerates the determination of liability and 
does not have the effect of enlarging any 
substantive rights. 
6 C. Wright and A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, §1448, 
pp. 263-65 (1971). Another leading authority likewise states: 
As in all third-party practices, the accrual 
of a right is sometimes accelerated under Rule 
14. Rule 14(a) authorizes impleader of a party 
"who is or may be liable." . . . Rule 14 may 
also accelerate the right of contribution among 
joint tortfeasors even though such a right is 
"inchoate, unascertainable and contingent until 
[the joint tortfeasor] pays more than his pro-
portionate share of the common liability." 
3 J. Moore, W. Taggart, and J. Wicker Moore's Federal Practice 
and Procedure, §1408, pp. 14-50, 14-52 (1988). 
Markvicka v. Broadhead-Garrett Co., 76 F.R.D. 205 (D. Neb. 
1977), illustrates this concept. In Markvicka, an action was 
brought on behalf of a student who was severely injured while 
using a jointer machine at school. The plaintiff sued the 
manufacturer of the jointer machine. The manufacturer filed a 
third-party complaint against the school district, alleging 
improper maintenance of the machine and inadequate supervision of 
the student. The school district moved to dismiss the third-party 
complaint. The district court denied the motion to dismiss. 
The court construed a provision of Nebraska law which read 
"There is no absolute bar to contribution among negligent joint 
tortfeasors" as envisioning contribution not only among those 
against whom a plaintiff has successfully obtained judgment but 
also among those whose liability remains to be fixed in either a 
third-party claim in the original plaintiff?s suit or in an inde-
pendent action for contribution by the original defendant. The 
court then stated: 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 14(a) permits the joinder of a 
party who "is or may be liable" to the defending 
party for all or part of the plaintiff's claim. 
Where the state law creates a right to contribu-
tion or indemnity among tortfeasors, the wrong-
doer who has been sued by an injured party may 
implead his co-wrongdoers before the plaintiff 
successfully obtains a judgment. "The fact the 
contribution may not actually be obtained until 
the original defendant has been cast in judgment 
and has paid does not prevent impleader; the 
impleader judgment may be so fashioned as to 
protect the rights of other tortfeasors, so that 
defendant's judgment against them may not be 
enforced until the defendant has paid plaintiff's 
judgment or more than his proportionate share, 
whichever the law may require." 
Id. at 207 (quoting 3 Moore's Fed. Practice, §14.11 at 14-322 
(1976 ) , et seq.) 
In Heath v. Bd. of Commissioners of Guilford County, 233 
S.E.2d 889 (N.C. 1977), dog bite victims brought suit against the 
county commissioners who had denied the plaintiffs1 claim for 
damages. The county then joined the dog owner as a third party 
defendant, alleging that the county was entitled to contribution 
from the owner for any award which the plaintiffs might recover. 
The trial court granted the third-party dog owner's motion to 
dismiss, and the county appealed. On appeal, the dog owner argued 
that the county's right to reimbursement did not accrue or vest 
until the county paid the plaintiff's claim. 
The North Carolina court held that the third-party 
complaint stated a cause of action which could be initiated and 
maintained prior to the entry of judgment against the original 
defendant. The court noted that Rule 14 of the North Carolina 
Rules of Procedure allows a defendant to maintain an action against 
a party "who is or may be liable to him for all or part of the 
plaintiff's complaints against him." :id. at 893. The court then 
set forth the purposes of Rule 14: 
The purpose of Rule 14 is to promote judicial 
efficiency and the convenience of parties by 
eliminating circuity of action. "When the 
rights of all three parties center upon a 
common factual setting, economies of time and 
expense can be achieved by combining the suits 
into one action. Doing so eliminates duplica-
tion in the presentation of evidence and 
increases the likelihood that consistent results 
will be reached when multiple claims turn upon 
identical or similar proof. Additionally, the 
third-party practice procedure is advantageous 
in that a potentially damaging time lag between 
judgment against defendant in one action and 
judgment in his favor against the party 
ultimately liable in a subsequent action will 
be avoided. In short, Rule 14 is intended to 
provide a mechanism for disposing of multiple 
claims arising from a single set of facts in 
one action expeditiously and economically." 
These saluatory purposes should not be frustrated 
whenever the defendant indemnitee denies his 
liability and resists paying the plaintiff's 
claim. Yet this is precisely what would happen 
here were the courts to cling to the doctrine 
that no liability exists in the indemnitor to 
the indemnitee (and thus no cause of action 
arose) until the indemnitee had first satisfied 
the underlying obligation. Accordingly, in 
order to reconcile Rule 14 practice with the 
old substantive law of indemnification, the 
federal courts have developed a doctrine of 
accelerated liability which allows third-party 
practice without the initial payment of the 
underlying liability. 
Id. at 893 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
The court in Patten v. Knutzen, 646 F.Supp. 427 (D. Colo. 
1986), also had occasion to note that a right of contribution may 
be accelerated. Patten arose out of a two-car accident. A passen-
ger in the first car sued the driver of the second car. The driver 
of the second car then filed a third-party complaint for contribu-
tion against the driver of the first vehicle. The driver of the 
first vehicle moved to dismiss the third-party complaint, arguing 
that under Colorado law, a claim for contribution could not be 
brought until there was payment of a judgment. 
The Colorado court first noted that a right of contribu-
tion did exist under Colorado law since Colorado had adopted the 
Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act. The Colorado statute 
allowed contribution when "two or more persons become jointly or 
severally liable in tort for the same injury to person or property 
. . . even though judgment has not been recovered against all or 
any of them." 1(3. at 429. Having found that a substantive right 
of contribution may exist prior to judgment, the court applied Rule 
14 and denied the third-party defendants motion to dismiss, and 
held: 
Moreover, it would not change this holding if 
Colorado's substantive law did not recognize 
a right to contribution until the original 
defendant had actually paid the judgment. Any 
judgment on the third-party claim does not 
become enforceable until after the common 
liability has been discharged by the original 
defendant. Impleader under Rule 14 merely 
accelerates the determination of liability 
and does not have the effect of enlarging any 
substantive rights. 
Id. at 430 (citations omitted). 
The above cases reflect the view taken by a clear majority 
of jurisdictions that a joint tortfeasor has a vested right to 
maintain an action for contribution prior to the entry of judgment. 
See, Minneapolis, St. P. & S.S.N.R. Co. v. City of Fond du Lac, 297 
F.2d 583 (7th Cir. 1961); Smithkline Beckman Corp. v. Pennex 
Products Co., 103 F.R.D. 539 (E.D. Pa. 1984); In Re Oil Spill By 
"Amoco Cadiz" Off Coast Of France, 491 F.Supp. 161 (N.D. 111. 
1979); Strong v. Nebraska Nat. Gas Co., 476 F.Supp. 1170 (D. Neb. 
197 9); Bosin v. Minneapolis, St. Paul and Sault Ste. Marie R. Co., 
183 F.Supp. 820 (E.D. Wise. 1960); Vaughn v. Terminal Transport 
Co., 162 F.Supp. 647 (E.D. Tenn. 1957); New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. 
Pertrik, 343 So.2d 48 (Fla.App. 1977); Independent Mfg. Co. Inc. 
v. Automotive Products Inc., 233 S.E.2d 874 (Ga.App. 1977); State 
Ex Rel General Electric Co. v. Gaertner, 666 S.W.2d 764 (Mo. 1984); 
Markey v. Skoq, 129 N.J. Super. 192, 322 A.2d 513 (1974); Mattia 
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 531 A.2d 789 (Pa. Super. 1987); Velsicol 
Chemical Corp, v. Rowe, 543 S.W.2d 337 (Tenn. 1976); Gemco-Ware v. 
Rongene Mold and Plastics, 360 S.E.2d 342 (Va. 1987). 
The Utah Contribution Statute, Utah Code Ann. 
§78-27-39(1), in existence at the time of the tortious acts of 
Fire Insurance Exchange and the Bank, is consistent with the 
above-cited cases and principles. Utah Code Ann. §78-27-39(1) 
[repealed 1986] provided: 
(1) The right of contribution shall exist 
among joint tortfeasors, but a joint 
tortfeasor shall not be entitled to any 
judgment for contribution until he has, 
by payment, discharged the common lia-
bility for more than his pro rata share 
thereof. (Emphasis added) 
It is indisputable that a substantive right to contribu-
tion existed in Utah at the time of the alleged wrongdoings by Fire 
Insurance Exchange and the Bank. The statutefs language that a 
joint tortfeasor is not entitled to a judgment for contribution 
until the tortfeasor has discharged the common liability refers 
only to when the claim for monetary damages becomes enforceable. 
Once a co-joint tortfeasor is joined in an action by way of a 
crossclaim or third-party claim, the right to have that partyfs 
liability determined accelerates and vests. While the right to 
collect monetary damages from a co-joint tortfeasor may still be 
inchoate and contingent, the right to have that party present and 
the right to have a single tribunal determine the parties' respec-
tive liability vest once joinder is accomplished. 
Rule 14 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is similar or 
identical to the rules of procedure relied upon by the courts in 
the above-cited cases. U.R.C.P. 14(a) provides that a defendant 
"may cause a summons and complaint to be served upon a person not a 
party to the action who is or may be liable to him for all or part 
of the plaintiff's claim against him." Thus, the same purposes and 
justifications for Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
can also be attributed to U.R.C.P. 14: 
Thus, although a defendant is not necessarily 
bound to proceed against a joint tortfeasor in 
the same action in which the plaintiff seeks to 
establish his (defendant's) liability, he 
ordinarily will, nevertheless, do so because a 
single action is the most orderly and logical 
manner in which proof of common liability can 
be established—and it is of course common 
liability which is the substantive basis of the 
right of contribution. . . . The logic is 
recognized that to allow such a procedure [the 
third-party action for contribution] efficiently 
conserves the court's time, effort, expense, 
and provides consistency of result where the 
action which establishes the plaintiff's right 
to recovery also establishes against whom that 
recovery should be made. The same jury that 
understands the plaintiff's case should also 
be permitted to relate why it found in favor 
of the plaintiffs by naming the defendants 
against whom recovery should be made. If there 
is no recovery for the plaintiff there can be 
no right for contribution. (Emphasis added) 
New Hampshire Insurance Co. v. Petrik, 343 So.2d 48, 50 (Fla. 
Dist.Ct.App. 1977) . 
In the instant case, the interests of fundamental justice 
require that Fire Insurance Exchange be permitted to maintain its 
action for contribution against Rocky Mountain State Bank. Fire 
Insurance Exchange had a right to have its claim for contribution 
heard contemporaneously with the Crookstons' primary action. The 
trial court's error in granting summary judgment in favor of Rocky 
Mountain State Bank effectively denied Fire Insurance Exchange's 
right to have the same jury, which determined the aggregate 
damages, also apportion the respective fault of the defendants. 
The trial court's action poses an intolerable risk of inconsistent 
verdicts as well as the risk of an inequitable apportionment of 
liability between Fire Insurance Exchange and Rocky Mountain State 
Bank. 
C. Rocky Mountain State Bank Waived Any Right It Had 
to Rely Upon the Stay in the Instant Action. 
The records in the instant action and in the related 
underlying action evidence an unbroken pattern of conduct or 
inaction over a period of many months in which Fire Insurance 
Exchange acted to its prejudice in ignorance of the stay that had 
been entered in the above-entitled matter. Fire Insurance Exchange 
filed its notice of appeal against Rocky Mountain State Bank on or 
about July 2, 1987. Over the course of the next two months, 
appellate counsel for Fire Insurance Exchange continued to have 
repeated contacts with counsel for the Bank. Several extensions 
of time to file a brief were granted by counsel for Rocky Mountain 
State Bank to appellate counsel for Fire Insurance Exchange. (See 
Supreme Court Appeal No. 870252.) On August 28, 1987, unknown to 
Fire Insurance Exchange, the stay in the instant action was 
entered by the trial court. No notice of the stay was ever served 
upon Fire Insurance Exchange or its counsel until nearly six 
months later. In the interim, Fire Insurance Exchange filed its 
appellate brief. Not until on or about February 25, 1988, a few 
days before the Bank's brief was due to be filed with the Court, 
did counsel for the Bank inform appellate counsel for Fire 
Insurance Exchange that a stay had been entered against all 
proceedings involving Rocky Mountain State Bank. 
The record demonstrates that Fire Insurance Exchange was 
effectively denied the requisite notice required by the Financial 
Institutions Act, Utah Code Ann. §7-2-1 et seq., and was denied 
the opportunity to seek leave from the stay before incurring 
substantial expenses in preparing its appellate brief. It is well 
recognized that estoppel or waiver may be used to cut off rights 
or privileges conferred by statutes. See Mountain Stone Co. v. 
H. W. Hammond Co., 39 Colo.App. 16, 564 P.2d 958 (1977). This 
Court has also recognized that one by his action or inaction may 
be prevented from relying upon certain facts or rights. Grover 
v. Garn, 23 Utah 2d 441, 464 P.2d 598 (1970). 
The trial court committed error in failing to find that 
the Bank waived its right to rely on the stay, and that the Bank's 
knowing inaction to the detriment of Fire Insurance Exchange 
established sufficient good cause to lift the stay in the instant 
action. This Court should reverse the ruling of the trial court 
and lift the stay imposed in the instant action insofar as it 
affects Appeal No. 870252. 
D. Good Cause Existed For Lifting the Stay Due to the Prejudice 
That Fire Insurance Exchange Would Sustain as a Result of 
Appeal No. 870252 Being Indefinitely Stayed. 
As a result of the order dismissing Fire Insurance 
Exchange's cross-claim against the Bank on the morning of trial, 
and the subsequent certification of that order as a final order 
pursuant to Rule 54(b), U.R.C.P., Fire Insurance Exchange was 
required to initiate two separate appeals to preserve all claims 
of error. The first appeal, Supreme Court Appeal No. 870252, 
involves only the Bank and Fire Insurance Exchange. Due to the 
stay that was entered in the instant case, the first appeal, No. 
870252, has been indefinitely stayed. The second appeal, Supreme 
Court Appeal No. 880034, arises from Fire Insurance Exchanged 
appeal from the principal case involving the Crookstons. Although 
filed separately, the two appeals involve such common questions of 
law and fact that the appeals are, in fact, inseparably related. 
Indeed, the resolution of either appeal will likely affect the 
outcome of the other. 
To permit one portion of the trial court's alleged errors 
to be reviewed, while effectively denying judicial review of other 
errors will likely result in substantial prejudice to Fire 
Insurance Exchange. Any piecemeal review of the trial court's 
actions will deny Fire Insurance Exchange its right to a 
fundamentally fair appellate process. This court should be 
permitted to view the "whole picture" of the proceedings before 
the trial court. If the trial court indeed committed error in 
dismissing the Bank on the morning of trial, this Court should be 
given the opportunity to review the appropriateness of that order, 
and what effect that order might have had in the trial of the case 
in chief. The trial court abused its discretion in refusing to 
lift the stay entered in the instant case insofar as it affects 
Appeal No. 870252. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S AFFIRMANCE OF THE DENIAL OF 
FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE'S CLAIM BY THE FDIC 
VIOLATED FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE'S RIGHTS TO 
DUE PROCESS AND ACCESS TO THE COURTS. 
Both the Constitution of the United States and the Utah 
Constitution guarantee that a person may not be deprived of "life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law." United States 
Constitution, Amend. V and Amend. XIV, Utah Constitution, Art. I, 
§7. The Utah Constitution also declares that an individual shall 
have a right to a "remedy by due course of law" for injury to 
"person, property, or reputation." Utah Constitution, Art. I, 
§11. Article I, §11 of the Utah Constitution specifically states: 
All courts shall be open, and every person, 
for an injury done to him and his person, 
property, or reputation, shall have remedy 
by due course of law, which shall be admin-
istered without denial or unnecessary delay; 
and no person shall be barred from prosecuting 
or defending before any tribunal in this state, 
by himself or counsel any civil cause to which 
he is a party. (Emphasis added.) 
The Utah Open Courts provision, Utah Constitution, Art. 
I, §11, is similar and complementary to the right to due process 
and fundamental fairness. However, the separate constitutional 
guarantees of due process and open courts are not wholly 
duplicative. Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 675 
(Utah 1985). While the guarantee of due process means that a 
party shall have his day in court, the Utah Open Courts provision 
limits the legislature's ability to arbitrarily restrict the 
remedies available to a party through due process of laws. 1(3. at 
674-81; Christiansen v. Harris, 109 Utah 1, 163 P.2d 314 (1945) 
(due process includes the right to have an inquiry into the merits 
of a legal question by a body authorized by law to determine the 
question); and Jensen v. Union Pacific Railway Co., 6 Utah 25 3, 
21 P. 994 (1889) (due process means that a party shall be entitled 
to his day in court). 
The Utah Financial Institution Act which provided the 
statutory grounds for the stay entered in the instant action has 
effectively denied Fire Insurance Exchange's right to due process 
under the law, as well as Fire Insurance Exchange's access to the 
courts of the state of Utah. As set forth in Point I, supra, Fire 
Insurance Exchange has a right to maintain an action for 
contribution against Rocky Mountain State Bank. It is undisputed 
that all of the acts and omissions to act on the part of the joint 
tortfeasors, Rocky Mountain State Bank and Fire Insurance 
Exchange, occurred long before the stay was entered in the instant 
action. In addition, the shocking and unprecedented $4.8 million 
verdict was returned against Fire Insurance Exchange even before 
the FDIC stepped in as receiver for the Bank. Thus, all of the 
critical facts establishing Rocky Mountain State Bank's potential 
liability as a joint tortfeasor occurred prior to the takeover of 
the Bank. 
While Fire Insurance Exchange's right to monetary 
contribution from the Bank might have technically remained in a 
inchoate state, pending payment by Fire Insurance Exchange of more 
than its pro rata share of the judgment, Fire Insurance Exchange 
had a vested right at the time of the improper granting of summary 
judgment in favor of Rocky Mountain State Bank to have the Bank 
remain present during the trial of the related underlying action. 
The actions of the trial court in refusing to lift the stay in the 
instant action and in affirming the denial of Fire Insurance 
Exchange's claims against the Bank effectively denies judicial 
review of the Bank's conduct. The trial court's actions further-
more effectively deny any remedy to Fire Insurance Exchange 
against the Bank. 
The United States Supreme Court in Wilson v. Iseminger, 
185 U.S. 55, 62 (1902), noted that a fundamental obligation of 
government is to provide reasonable remedies for wrongs done: 
Every government is under obligation to its 
citizens to afford them all needful legal 
remedies . . . . A statute could not bar the 
existing rights of plaintiffs without affording 
this opportunity [to try rights in the courts]; 
if it should attempt to do so, it would [be] 
an unlawful attempt to extinguish rights 
arbitrarily, whatever might be the purport of 
its provisions. 
In essence, the constitutional guarantees of open courts and due 
process mean that claimants, like Fire Insurance Exchange, should 
be entitled to meaningful access to the courts in order to obtain 
meaningful remedies. If access to the courts is arbitrarily 
denied or delayed, or the available remedies are inadequate or 
meaningless, the constitutional protections of due process and 
access to the courts are violated. In the instant case, Fire 
Insurance Exchange's right to access to the courts for meaningful 
review of a trial court's clearly erroneous ruling and for an 
effective remedy against the Bank has, at a minimum, been severely 
restricted and delayed. 
In Berry, this Court set forth the basic parameters of 
the Utah Open Courts constitutional provision. In Berry, the 
Court noted that the Open Courts provision guarantees a claimants 
"access to the courts in a judicial procedure that is based on 
fairness and equity." Berry, 717 P.2d at 675. The Open Courts 
provision likewise prohibits any arbitrary deprivation of 
"effective remedies designed to protect basic individual rights." 
Id. Furthermore, §11 also establishes that the guarantee of 
access to the courthouse is not an empty gesture, and that 
claimants are entitled "to a remedy by !due course of law1 for 
injuries to 'person, property, or reputation.1" Id. 
While this Court in Berry recognized that Article I, §11 
does not constitutionalize the common law or freeze the law gov-
erning personal rights and remedies, the Court noted that §11 does 
prohibit the wholesale abolition of all causes of action for 
injuries to one's personal property without provision for 
"substitute equivalent remedies." I_d. at 679. 
This Court in Berry suggested that a two-part analysis 
must be applied before any statute may constitutionally divest a 
litigant from a vested interest in a particular rule of law: 
We hold that Section 11 of the Declaration of 
Rights and the prerogative of the legislature 
are properly accommodated by applying a two-part 
analysis. First, Section 11 is satisfied if the 
law provides an injured person an effective and 
reasonable alternative remedy "by due course 
of law" for vindication of his constitutional 
interest. The benefit provided by the sub-
stitute must be substantially equal in value 
or other benefit to the remedy abrogated in 
providing essentially comparable substantive 
protection to onefs person, property, or 
reputation, although the form of the substitute 
remedy may be different. 
* * * 
Second, if there is no substitute or alternative 
remedy provided, abrogation of the remedy or 
cause of action may be justified only if there 
is a clear social or economic evil to be elim-
inated and the elimination of an existing 
legal remedy is not an arbitrary or unreason-
able means for achieving the objective. 
Id. at 680. 
In the instant case, the legislature in enacting the Utah 
Financial Institutions Act could not have possibly foreseen the 
potentially devastating consequences the Act might have in a case 
such as the instant action. The quasi-judicial process provided 
under Utah Code Ann. §7-2-1 et seq. for the review of claims 
against an insolvent bank does not even approximate the judicial 
process and remedy to which Fire Insurance Exchange was entitled 
before the Bank was declared insolvent and the stay entered. 
The Utah Financial Institutions Act is also constitution-
ally infirm because in the instant case, the provisions of the 
statute do not serve to eliminate any "clear social or economic 
evil." Fire Insurance Exchange understands and admits that the 
Bank represents that it has no assets available to satisfy any 
portion of the $4.8 million judgment entered in the related under-
lying action. However, there is a potential resource for the sat-
isfaction of at least a portion of that judgment in Rocky Mountain 
State Bank's liability policy with United Pacific Insurance 
Company. (R. at 588) Furthermore, at the trial court level, Fire 
Insurance Exchange requested that at a minimum, that the trial 
court lift the stay to permit this Court to determine whether the 
mere fact of the Bank's absence from the trial was so prejudicial 
as to warrant a new trial, with or without the Bank as a party 
defendant. 
There is no risk to the Bank, the FDIC, the Commissioner 
of Financial Institutions, or Utah financial institutions in 
general, posed by Appeal No. 870252 being permitted to be briefed 
and ruled upon. The total elimination of Fire Insurance 
Exchange's claims against the Bank, and the indefinite delay of 
the resolution of Appeal No. 870252 has effectively denied Fire 
Insurance Exchange its right to vindicate its claims on appeal. 
As a result, the Utah Financial Institutions Act should be found 
to be an unreasonable and arbitrary infringement upon Fire 
Insurance Exchange's constitutional rights. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Fire Insurance Exchange 
respectfully requests that this court reverse the decision of the 
trial court and order that the stay imposed in the instant action 
be lifted so as to permit this court to review Appeal No. 870252 
on the merits. 
DATED t h is iffi/day of H^U^A 
STRONG & HANNI 
, 1989. 
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Attorneys for Fire Insurance 
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DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES 
Constitution of the United States, Amendment V 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or 
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment 
of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval 
forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War 
or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same 
offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life and limb; nor shall 
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, 
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, with-
out just compensation. 
Constitution of the United States Amend. XIV §1 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United 
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make 
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws. 
Constitution of Utah, Art. I, §7 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, 
without due process of law. 
Constitution of Utah, Art. I, §11 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury 
done to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have 
remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered without 
denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from 
prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this State, by 
himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party. 
Utah Code Annotated, §7-2-6(1)-(9 ) 
Notice of possession by commissioner—Presentation, allowance and 
disallowance of claims—Objections to claims. 
(1) Upon taking possession of any institution or other 
person under the jurisdiction of the department the commissioner 
shall post at each office of the institution or other person 
written notice of the taking. 
(2) Within 15 days after taking possession of an insti-
tution or other person under the jurisdiction of the department, 
the commissioner shall publish in a newspaper of general circula-
tion in each city or county in which the institution or other per-
son or any subsidiary or service corporation thereof maintains an 
office, a notice to all persons who may have claims against the 
institution or other person to present their claims with proof 
thereof to the commissioner before a date specified in the notice 
as the filing date. The filing date shall be at least 90 days 
after the date of the first publication of the notice. The notice 
shall be similarly published on dates approximately 30 days and 60 
days after the date of the first publication. Within 30 days of 
taking possession of a depository institution, the commissioner 
shall mail a similar notice to all persons whose names appear as 
depositors or other creditors upon the books or records of the 
institution. 
(3) With respect to a claim which appears in the books 
and records of an institution or other person in the possession of 
the commissioner as a secured claim, which, for purposes of this 
section is a claim that constitutes an enforceable, perfected 
lien, evidenced in writing, on the assets or other property of the 
institution: 
(a) Within 30 days after the receipt of a secured 
claim filed on or before the filing date, the 
commissioner shall allow or disallow each secured claim 
filed on or before the filing date within 30 days after 
receipt of the claim and shall notify each secured 
claimant by certified mail or in person of the basis for, 
and any conditions imposed on, the allowance or 
disallowance. 
(b) For all allowed secured claims, the 
commissioner shall be bound by the terms, covenants, and 
conditions relating to the assets or other property sub-
ject to the claim, as set forth in the note, bond, or 
other security agreement which evidences the secured 
claim, unless the commissioner has given notice to the 
claimant of his intent to abandon the assets or other 
property subject to the secured claim at the time the 
commissioner gave the notice described in Subsection 
7-2-6(3)(a). 
(4) With respect to all other claims other than secured 
claims: 
(a) Each claim filed on or before the filing date 
shall be allowed or disallowed within 180 days after the 
final publication of notice. 
(b) If the commissioner disallows any claim in 
whole or in part, he shall notify the claimant by 
certified mail or in person within 30 days after making 
the determination. If notice of disallowance is not 
served upon the claimant by the commissioner within 210 
days after the date of final publication of notice, the 
claim is considered allowed. 
(5) Claims filed after the filing date are disallowed, 
unless: 
(a) the claimant who did not file his claim timely 
demonstrates that he did not have notice or actual knowl-
edge of the proceedings in time to timely file a proof of 
claim; and 
(b) proof of the claim was filed prior to the first 
distribution of assets. 
(6) Debts owing to the United States or to any state or 
its subdivisions as a penalty or forfeiture are not allowed, 
except for the amount of the pecuniary loss sustained by the act, 
transaction, or proceeding out of which the penalty or forfeiture 
arose. 
(7) Except as otherwise provided in Subsection 
7-2-15(1)(a) and Chapter 8a, interest accruing on any claim after 
the commissioner has taken possession of an institution or other 
person under this chapter may be disallowed. 
(8) Claims against an institution are disallowed, unless 
evidenced by one or more written documents executed by an author-
ized officer of the institution, except for claims of trade 
creditors for goods sold or services rendered if the requirement 
of a writing is not customary in the particular trade or business. 
(9) Objection to any claim allowed or disallowed may be 
made by any depositor or other claimant by filing a written objec-
tion with the commissioner within 30 days after service of the 
notice of allowance or disallowance. The commissioner shall pre-
sent the objection to the court for hearing and determination upon 
written notice to the claimant and to the filing party. The notice 
shall set forth the time and place of hearing. After the 30-day 
period, no objection may be filed. This subsection does not apply 
to secured claims allowed under Subsection (3). 
Utah Code Annotated, §7-2-7(1) 
Stay of proceedings against institution. 
(1) Except as otherwise specified in Subsection (2), a 
taking of an institution or other person by the commissioner under 
this chapter shall operate as a stay of the commencement or con-
tinuation of: (a) any judicial, administrative, or other 
proceeding against the institution, including service of process; 
(b) the enforcement of any judgment against the institution; 
(c) any act to obtain possession of property of or from the 
institution; (d) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien 
against property of the institution; (e) any act to collect, 
assess, or recover a claim against the institution; and (f) the 
setoff of any debt owing to the institution against any claim 
against the institution. Upon application and after notice and 
hearing, the court may, for cause shown, terminate, annul, modify, 
or condition the stay. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON (#3472) 
Attorney General 
STEPHEN G. SCHWENDIMAN (#2891) 
Chief, Assistant Attorney General 
BRYCE H. PETTEY (#2593) 
Assistant Attorney General 
Tax & Business Regulation Div. 
Attorneys for George Sutton, 
Commissioner of Financial 
Institutions of the State of Utah 
130 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 533-5319 
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n-.-«;r CLERK 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR IRON- COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
POSSESSION OF ROCKY MOUNTAIN 
STATE BANK BY THE COMMISSIONER 
OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
ORDER APPROVING POSSESSION 
civil NO. CJ^Zz£ZSL3 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
This matter came before the Court e& E>a£_te on the 
day of August, 1987, pursuant to the "Verified Petition for Order 
Approving Possession" of Rocky Mountain State Bank ("Bank") by 
George Sutton, Commissioner of Financial Institutions of the 
State of Utah ("Commissioner"). The Commissioner was represented 
by Bryce H. Pettey, Assistant Attorney General. 
It appearing to the Court that the Commissioner has, 
under Utah^Code^Ann^ § 7-2-1(2) (Supp. 1987), found that: 
(1) The Bank has violated laws, rules and regulations 
governing the Bank, which in part constitutes grounds for taking 
possession under Utah_Cgd_e_Anai. § 7-2-1(1) (b) (Supp*. 1987); and 
(2) The Bank is conducting its business in an 
unauthorized or unsafe manner, and is engaging in conduct inju-
rious to its depositors and the public, which in part constitutes 
grounds for taking possession under Utatl-CQde^Ann^ § 7-2-1(1) (c) 
(Supp. 1987); and 
(3) The Bank has been notified by the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation ("F.D.I.C. ") , which is the Bank's primary 
account insurer, ot F.D.I.C.'s intention to initiate proceedings 
to terminate such insurance, and the Bank is otherwise not in a 
sound and safe condition to transact its business, which in part 
constitutes grounds for taking possession under U£sh_Qgde_Ann^ 
§ 7-2-1(1)(d) (Supp. 1987); and 
(4) The Bank has failed to maintain a minimum amount 
of capital as required by the Department of Financial Institu-
tions ("Department") and the F.D.I.C, which in part constitutes 
grounds for taking possession under Ujtah_Cgde_Ann._ § 7-2-1(1) (e) 
(Supp. 1987); and 
(5) The Bank has become or is about to become 
insolvent, which in part constitutes grounds for taking posses-
sion under Utah_Cgd.e_.Anni. § 7-2-1(1) (f) (Supp. 1987); and 
(6) The Bank has failed or refused to comply with the 
terms of a duly and legally authorized order issued by the Com-
missioner and by the F.D.I.C, which in part constitutes grounds 
for taking possession under Ut&hj^g4£_Ana±_ § 7-2-1(1) (g) (Supp. 
1987); and 
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(7) The remedies provided in Utah Code Ann* §§ 7-1-
307, -308, and -313 (Supp. 1987) are ineffective or impracticable 
to protect the interest of the Bank's depositors, creditors, and 
shareholders, which in part constitutes grounds for taking pos-
session under Ut&liJ^ gd.§._AnrL±. § 7-1-1(1) (k) (Supp. 1987); and 
It appearing to the Court that the purpose of this 
proceeding is to provide this Court with supervisory jurisdiction 
to review the actions of the Commission in accordance with, and 
pursuant to UL&tLJCL&i£.JkaajL § 7-2-2 (Supp. 1987) ; and 
It appearing to the Court that all conditions required 
by Utah^CgLde^Anru. § 7-2-1(2) (Supp. 1987) have been met for the 
Commissioner to take possession of the Bank; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 
1. George Sutton, Commissioner of Financial 
Institutions of the State of Utah, is authorized to take immedi-
ate possession of the Bank, and thereupon the Commissioner is 
vested, by this Order and by operation of law, with title to, and 
the right to possession of, the business, property, and all 
assets of the Bank. 
2. George Sutton, Commissioner of Financial 
Institution of the State of Utah, is authorized and directed to 
rehabilitate, reorganize, liquidate or give effect to the acqui-
sition of control of, the merger with, the acquisition of all or 
a portion of the assets of, or the assumption of all or a portion 
-3-
of the liabilities of, the Bank in such manner as the Commission-
er determines to be in the best interest of the Bank's deposi-
tors, creditors, shareholders and other parties in interest, and 
to do all other things in connection therewith as may be autho-
rized by law. 
3. George Sutton, Commissioner of Financial 
Institutions of the State of Utah, is authorized to appoint a 
liquidator or receiver for the Bank if the Commissioner deems it 
appropriate to do so. 
4. All persons are ordered and directed to turn over 
immediately to the Commissioner any of the business, property or 
assets of the Bank in their possession. 
5. This Order shall operate as a stay of the 
commencement or continuation of: 
(a) Any judicial, administrative or other proceeding 
against the Bank, including service of process; 
(b) Enforcement of any judgement against the Bank; 
(c) Any act to obtain possession of property of or 
from the Bank; 
(d) Any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien 
against property of the Bank; 
(e) Any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim 
against the Bank; and 
- 4 -
( f ) The s e t o f f of any d e b t owning t o t h e Bank a g a i n s t 
any c l a i m a g a i n s t t h e Bank. 
DATED t h i s $ £ _ day of A u g u s t , 1 9 8 7 . 
D^f-ERICT/JUDC 
C-w. " \ 
Deputv t\M\ 
- 5 -
<4j p byrv-r^+jj J Tt 
JFVC 
FRANCIS M. WIKSTROM (A3462) 
DANIEL W. HINUERT (A1497) 
of and for 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for 
Rocky Mountain State Bank 
in Supreme Court Case No. 870252 
185 South State Street, Suite 700 
P.O. Box 11898 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84147-0898 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
-'• f. -. y 
•
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * 
IN THE MATTER OF THE POSSESSION 
OF ROCKY MOUNTAIN STATE BANK 
BY THE COMMISSIONER OF 
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
ORDER 
C i v i l No. C87-5743 
J u d g e J . D e n n i s F r e d e r i c k 
* * * * * * * * 
Fire Insurance Exchange's Motion to Lift Stay, peti-
tioning this Court to lift the U.C.A. § 7-2-7 stay of litigation 
against Rocky Mountain State Bank for purposes of the appeal in 
Utah Supreme Court Case No. 870252, having come before this Court 
for hearing on Friday, April 8, 1988; this Court having reviewed 
said motion and a supporting memorandum, having heard oral argu-
ment, and having taken the matter under advisement with a request 
for supplemental briefs to be submitted to this Court after the 
Utah Supreme Court reconsidered its consolidation of Case No. 
870252 and No. 880034; this Court having reviewed all 
supplemental briefs and having taken notice of the Order of the 
Utah Supreme Court dated April 18, 1988 denying consolidation of 
Cases No. 870252 and No. 880034; and this Court having found that 
Fire Insurance Exchange has not shown cause why the U.C.A. 
§ 7-2-7 stay should be lifted; now, therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Fire Insurance Exchange's 
Motion to Lift Stay be and it is hereby denied. 
ENTERED this /± day of /;///>L\ , 1988. 
BY THE CO J ORT: 
"> / 
THIRD DISTRICT JUDGE 
Approved as to form: 
By: 
PHILIP R. FISHLER, Esq. 
STEPHEN J. TRAYNER, Esq. 
<2&£>C&& 
D a t e d : 
By: fc x —4**Q*A- y ^ ^y- ~6 ^ D a t e d ; 
PETER W. BILLINGS, v/SR. , E s q . 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing proposed ORDER was mailed, postage prepaid, this 2% ~ 
day of April, 1988, to: 
Attorneys for 
Fire Insurance Exchange 
Philip R. Fishier, Esq. 
Stephen J. Trayner, Esq. 
STRONG & HANNI 
Sixth Floor 
Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for FDIC 
Peter W. Billings, Sr., Esq. 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
215 South State Street, 12th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151 
Attorneys for Crookstons 
L. Rich Humpherys, Esq. 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C. 
510 Clark Learning Building 
175 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
r-Ks (Zc^ jL^^t 
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PHILIP R. FISHLER, #1083 
STEPHEN J. TRAYNER, #4928 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Fire Insurance Exchange 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7080 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ) PROOF OF CLAIM 
POSSESSION OF ROCKY MOUNTAIN ) 
STATE BANK BY THE COMMISSIONER ) Civil No. C87-5743 
OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, ) Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
Fire Insurance Exchange, by and through counsel, alleges 
as its proof of claim: 
1. Fire Insurance Exchange is a defendant in the matter 
captioned Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange and Rocky Mountain 
State Bank, Third District Civil No. C83-1030, currently pending 
before the Utah Supreme Court in Appeals Nos. 87-0252 and 
88-0034. 
2. Appeal number 87-0252 involves the issue of whether 
Fire Insurance Exchange has a right of contribution and/or 
indemnity from Rocky Mountain State Bank for any judgment 
rendered against Fire Insurance Exchange in the matter captioned 
Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange and Rocky Mountain State 
Bank. 
3. A judgment in excess of $4.8 million was entered 
against Fire Insurance Exchange in the matter captioned Crookston 
tp-Jv-^  Tncnr-arn-o Pvph^nrrp n^rJ Rnr-lcv Mountain ^fafp Bank. 
4. As a result of the judgment entered against Fire 
Insurance Exchange in said action, Fire Insurance Exchange 
maybe entitled to a right of contribution against Rocky Mountain 
State Bank. 
5. Fire Insurance Exchange hereby makes claim against 
Rocky Mountain State Bank for any and all amounts Rocky Mountain 
State Bank may become obligated to pay Fire Insurance Exchange 
in the future as a result of the entry of judgment in the 
ciction captioned Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange and 
Rocky Mountain State Bank. 
DATED this / V) day of [/A/**\ , 1988, 
Stephen J. Trayner 
Attorneys for Fire Insurance 
Exchange 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
above and foregoina Proof of Claim was mailed, postage prepaid, 
:his 7 0 th  IX?' day of 
following: 
, 1988, addressed to the 
Peter W. Billings, Sr. 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
215 South State #1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
George R. Sutton 
Department of Financial Inst, 
300 South 160 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Peter W. Billings, Sr., #A0329 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN, 
a Professional Corporation 
Attorneys for Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation 
Twelfth Floor 
215 South State Street 
P.O. Box 510210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151 
Telephone: (801) 531-8900 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE POSSESSION ) NOTICE OF DENIAL OF CLAIM 
OF ROCKY MOUNTAIN STATE BANK BY ) 
THE COMMISSIONER OF FINANCIAL ) Civil No. C87-5743 
INSTITUTIONS, ) 
) Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
TO FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE AND ITS COUNSEL OF RECORD: 
You may consider the Proof of Claim filed by Fire 
Insurance Exchange under date of May 16, 1988, to be denied by 
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation as receiver of Rocky 
Mountain State Bank on the grounds set forth in the denial letter 
mailed to counsel for Fire Insurance Exchange under date of May 
2, 1988, copy attached. The filing of the Proof of Claim merely 
responds to the first paragraph of the May 2, 1988, denial. 
Accordingly, any matter contained in the May 16, 1988, 
Proof of Claim may be considered at the hearing under Section 
7-2-6(9) now set for August 1, 1988, at 10:30 a.m., before the 
Honorable J. Dennis Frederick. 
JUL 20 II n m «83 
"•-
 r
~< CLERK 
r^ ' • wlIRT 
w.r».reie»n 
,-<y< \ 
The Proof of Claim asserts that Fire Insurance Exchange 
"may be entitled to a right of contribution against Rocky Moun-
tain State Bank." Under Utah lawf the claim for contribution has 
not yet arisen and will not do so until Fire Insurance Exchange 
meets the statutory requirements specified in the Comparative 
Negligence Act. Unigard Insurance Co. v. City of LaVerkin, 689 
P.2d 1344 (Utah 1984) . 
On August 28, 1987, the Rocky Mountain State Bank was 
declared insolvent by the Utah Commissioner of Financial Institu-
tions. It is well-settled that the rights and liabilities of 
Rocky Mountain State Bank and its creditors are fixed at the dec-
laration of insolvency and no additional rights can be created 
after such insolvency. FDIC v. McKnight, 769 F.2d 658 (10th Cir. 
1985). As of August 28, 1987, Fire Insurance Exchange had no 
provable claim against Rocky Mountain State Bank. The amount 
thereof and liability therefor, if any, cannot be determined 
until Fire Insurance Exchange has, by payment, discharged the 
alleged common liability or more than its prorata share thereof. 
Section 78-27-39 UCA. 
On August 28, 1987, Fire Insurance Exchange's claim for 
contribution was contingent and dependent on subsequent events 
not certain to occur. Under such circumstances, to carry out the 
-2-
purposes of Section 7-2-6, 7-2-15 and 7-2-16, such claims are not 
allowable. 4 
Dated this It* day of July, 1988. 
\ WStiQar; 
Peter W. Billings, Sr. 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
a Professional Corporation 
Attorneys for Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation 
PWB:071988C 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
above-mentioned Notice of Denial of Claim was mailed, postage 
prepaid, this £J£> day of July, 1988, addressed as follows: 
Philip R. Fishier, Esq. 
Stephen J. Trayner, Esq. 
STRONG & HANNI 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
For Fire Insurance 
Exchange 
Francis M. Wikstrom, Esq. 
Daniel W. Hindert, Esq. 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
P.O. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, UT 84147-0898 
For Rocky Mountain 
State Bank 
Betty <J. 44ifsud, 
PWB.-071988C 
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le 
PCTCR W. •ICLINOS 
AUtCRT J . COLTON 
HAUPH M. MICL.Cn 
•RYCC c ROC 
GCORGC O. MCLLING, JR. 
WARffCN PATTCN 
M. SYRON nsncR 
STANrowo a. OWCN 
WILLIAM H. ADAMS 
ANTHONY L. HAMPTON 
PCTCR W. SILUNOS, JR. 
THOMAS CHRISTCNSCN, JR. 
RAND M. CLISON 
RANOACL A. MACKCY 
OCNISC A. OAAOOO 
JAY • . BCLL 
OANICL W. ANOCRSON 
GAMY C. J U M C H 
FABIAN & C L E N D E N I N 
A PROFCSSlONAi. CORPORATION 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
P. O. BOX 510210 
TWELFTH FLOOR 
215 SOUTH STATE STREET 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 8-4151 
TELEPHONE (SOI) 5 3 1 - 8 9 0 0 
TELECOPIER (SOI) SBQ-2BI4 
HAAOLO P. rASIAN 
ISSS*I97S 
SCVCRLY S. CUCNOCNIN 
ISSSH07I 
SANfORO M. STOOOARO 
IOOO-I974 
POSCMARY J. BCLCSS 
W. CULXCN SATTLC 
KCVIN N. ANOCRSON 
JATHAN W. J A NOV C 
MICHCLC MITCMCUL 
JOHN C. S. ROSSON 
OOUOUAS S. CANNON 
RANOY K. JOHNSON 
ROSCRT PALMCR RCCS 
JOOI KNOSCL TCUCRHCLM 
KCNCCY W. SRUNSOALC 
DOUGLAS J . PAYNE 
PATRICK L. ANOCRSON 
SHCLOON A. SMITH 
MARK L. MATH IC 
OIANC H. SANKS 
P. SRUCC SAOGCR 
Registered Mail May 2, 1988 
Phillip R. Fishier, Esq. 
Strong & Hanni 
600 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Re: Fire Insurance Exchange v. Rocky Mountain State Bank 
Dear Mr. Fishier: 
It is the position of the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation as receiver of Rocky Mountain State Bank that the 
pendency of the appeal by Fire Insurance Exchange from the judg-
ment of Judge Frederick in Case No. C83-1030 in the Third Judi-
cial District Court against Fire Insurance Exchange and in favor 
of the bank does not constitute a claim within the meaning of 
Section 7-2-6 Utah Code Annotated. In addition, the knowledge of 
the attorneys for the bank who were responding to the appeal but 
were paid by the insurance company for the bank does not consti-
tute the filing of a claim. 
However, if the pendency of the appeal be deemed a 
timely filed claim within the meaning of Section 7-2-6, you are 
hereby advised that the purported claim is hereby denied on the 
following grounds: 
1. The claim for contribution had not matured at the 
time the bank was closed and the receiver appointed. 
2. The claim for contribution has not yet matured or 
accrued. 
3. The claim for contribution does not meet the 
requirements of Section 7-2-6(8). 
4- The decision of Judge Frederick in dismissingjbha^ 
cross-claim of Fire Insurance Exchange against the^banXJwtd^ 
granting judgment in favor of the bank in his Order of June 91 
1987, in Case No. C83-1030 was correct* 
LAW O F F I C E S O F 
F A B I A N & C L E N D E N I N 
A OKOfCltlOMAI. CO*»0«ATlOM 
Phillip R. Fishier, Esq. 
May 2, 1988 
Page 2 
You are hereby advised that you may file a written 
objection to the ruling of the receiver, stating the grounds 
therefor, within 30 days after receipt of this notice. Such 
objection may be filed with the undersigned as counsel for the 
FDIC. 
Very truly yours. 
PWB:bjm 
cc: Edward J. Bennett, Esq. 
Francis M. Wikstrom, Esq. 
: i lED IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
Sz'.i Lake County, Utah 
1988 
-a O.st Court 
Peter W. Billings, Sr., #A0329 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN, 
a Professional Corporation 
Attorneys for Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation 
Twelfth Floor 
215 South State Street 
P.O. Box 510210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151 
Telephone: (801) 531-8900 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE POSSESSION 
OF ROCKY MOUNTAIN STATE BANK BY 
THE COMMISSIONER OF FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS, 
ORDER AFFIRMING DENIAL 
OF CLAIM 
Civil No. C87-5743 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
The objections of Fire Insurance Exchange to the denial 
of its claim against Rocky Mountain State Bank by the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation as receiver of said bank came on 
for hearing and determination pursuant to §7-2-6(9) on August 1, 
1988. 
The Court, being fully advised in the premises and hav-
ing heard and considered the arguments of counsel, finds the 
objections of Fire Insurance Exchange to the denial of its claim 
not well taken and hereby affirms the denial of the claims of 
Fire Insurance Exchange against Rocky Mountain State Bank by the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation as receiver of said bank. 
Dated thi is /p<3ay o f August, #988, by the Court 
APPROVED AS TO 
>hilip 
STRONG jf HANNI 
Attorneys for 
Fire Insurance Exchange 
Daniel W. Hindert 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for 
Rocky Mountain State Bank 
PWB:080288A 
,ATTEST 
/ V..DJXONHIN. ;. 
C\;r, 
-2-
AOI 
Fit .ViZT 
PHILIP R. FISHLER, #1083 
STEPHEN J. TRAYNER, #4928 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Fire Insurance Exchange 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7080 
•r [N THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
^ 
*F STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
POSSESSION OF ROCKY MOUNTAIN 
STATE BANK BY THE COMMISSIONER 
OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Civil No. C87-5743 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
Notice is hereby given that Fire Insurance Exchange hereby 
appeals to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah from the 
August 11, 1988, final order entered by the Honorable J. Dennis 
Frederick, affirming the denial of the claims of Fire Insurance 
Exchange against Rocky Mountain State Bank by the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation as receiver of said bank, and 
the May 16, 1988, order denying Fire Insurance Exchange's 
motion to lift the stay which was entered in the instant matter 
insofar as the stay may affect other appeals pending before 
the Utah Supreme Court m Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange 
and Rocky Mountain State Bank, Utah Supreme Court Nos. 870252 
and 880034. 
DATED this _ff__ day of 1988. 
R. FisfyL^r 
Stephen J. Trayner 
Attorneys for Fire Insurance 
Exchange 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
above and foregoing Notice of Appeal was mailed, postage prepaid, 
this JA day of v k ^ ^ j ^ ^ , 1988, addressed to the 
following: 
Francis M. Wikstrom, 
Daniel W. Hindert 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
185 South State, #700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Peter W. Billings 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
Twelfth Floor 
215 South State Street 
P. 0. Box 510210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151 
Frank A. Roybal 
Attorney at Law 
442 North Main Street 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
A23 
KClTM C TAYLOR 
JAMCS a. LCC 
s c o n M. MATMCSON 
G O R O O N u ROBCRTS 
r. ROBERT RCEOCR 
w i u j A M L. CRAwroRO 
1>WRCNCC E. STEVENS 
OANlEL M. ALLREO 
HOWAAO J . HARSH 
YAH M ROSS 
OAVIO S. OOCOWITZ 
KENT W WINTERMOLLER 
BARBARA K. POLtCH 
RANOY L. ORYER 
CHARt.CS H. TM RON SON 
OAVfO R. BIRO 
RAY MONO J . ETCHCVCRRY 
rRANClS M. WIKSTROM 
OAVIO W. TUNOCRMANN 
JAMCS M. ELEGANTE 
VAL R. ANTCZAK 
PATRICK J . GARVCR 
SPENCER C AUSTIN 
J O H N 8. WILSON 
ROBERT C NYOC 
LAW OFFICES 
PARSONS. BEHLE & LATIMER 
A *»orcss»o*«A4. C O « ^ « * T O N 
IBS SOUTH STATE STREET. SUITE 7 0 0 
POST Of rice aox nesa 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 841-47-06 3 6 
TELEPHONE laOH 333-<23<* 
TELECOPIER IOOO 3 3 2 • 2 3 - CXT 273 
lOl««*dTM STREET. N W , SUITE B O O 
W A S H I N G T O N . O.C. 2 0 0 3 « 
T E L E P H O N E ( 2 0 2 ) 6 3 9 - 0 6 6 2 
roRMcncY 
CLUS. PARSONS * MCCRCA 
C C »A*SON9 
CA4.VIM A, «CHl£ 
or COUNSCC 
CCORGC W. CATIMCR 
May 22, 1987 
FOR HAND DELIVERY c 93' 
QTP 
The Honorable J. Dennis Frederick 
Third Judicial District Court 
240 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Re: Crookston v. Fire Insurance 
U J i 
C R A I G B TERpy 
O A V I O A . A N O C R S O H 
KENT O. ROCHC 
P A T R I C I A J . W I N M I L L 
R A N O Y M G R I M S H A W 
O A N I E L W H I N O C R T 
T PATRICK CASCY 
VAUOCN P LIVINGSTON 
O R. CHAM8CRS 
B Y R O N W M I L S T E A O 
LOIS A. BAAR 
MARK C. R1N CHART 
MlCHACC L. CARSCN 
JONATHAN K. BUTLER 
OAVIO G. MANGUM 
J U U A C. ATTWOOO 
OEREK L A N G T O N 
LUCY B. JENKINS 
HAL J . POS 
W. MARK GAVRC 
OAVIO J . SMITH 
T O N I MARIC suTurr 
MARK S. WCBBCR 
R A N O A L L, MCCK 
JAMCS C. MYOC 
a n g e , e t a l . 
*D"ear ~3wc j d e r i c k *- - — 
This letter is to advise you that a settlement was 
reached between the plaintiffs and Rocky Mountain State Bank 
late Thursday afternoon. The stipulation was not executed 
by Anna Drake/ as Trustee, until Friday afternoon. Enclosed 
is the Stipulation, Motion and Order of Dismissal, We would 
request that you sign and enter the Order of Dismissal. 
In light of the settlement with plaintiffs, we 
have enclosed a Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum 
in Support/ directed to the crossclaim of Fire Insurance 
Exchange against Rocky Mountain State Bank seeking 
contribution and indemnity. 
Mr. Humpherys has advised us in writing that he 
will pursue no claims against the insurance company which 
are based on negligence theories. Mr. Humpherys has 
authorized me to represent to you that he will confirm this 
in open court on Tuesday. All of plaintiffs' claims are 
based on intentional torts and breach of contract. As the 
attached Memorandum of Points and Authorities demonstrates, 
there is no basis for contribution or indemnity under these 
theories. 
The Honorable J. Dennis Frederick 
May 22, 1987 
Page 2 
While the filing of our motion for summary 
judgment may not give Mr. Roybal as much time to respond as 
envisioned under the rules, we feel that it is appropriate 
to have it heard before the trial begins. If we are correct 
on the law, there is no point in requiring the Bank to sit 
through the plaintiffs1 case in order for the plaintiffs to 
demonstrate what they have already conceded, i.e., that they 
will assert no claims based on negligence. 
We have advised Mr. Roybal by phone on Friday 
afternoon of our intention to file this motion and have 
personally served him with a copy of this letter, the motion 
and memorandum on Friday evening. Under the circumstances, 
we would request that the matter be heard prior to 
commencement of the trial on Tuesdaysmorning. 
Sincerely, 
rancis M. Wikstrom 
FMW:cj / 
Ends. 
cc: (hand delivered) Frank A. Roybal, Esq. 
L. Rich Humpherys, Esq. 
A25 
FRANCIS M. WIKSTROM (A3462) 
DANIEL W. HINDERT (A1497) 
of and for 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Rocky Mountain State Bank 
185 South State Street, Suite 700 
P.O. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, UT 84147-0898 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * 
S. LARRY CROOKSTON and RANDI 
L. CROOKSTON, as individuals, 
and ANNA W. DRAKE, as Trustee 
of the Estate of S. Larry 
Crookston and Randi L. 
Crookston, 
Plaintiffs. 
vs. 
FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE, a 
California corporation, and 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN STATE BANK, 
a Utah corporation, 
Defendants, Cross-
complainants and 
Cross-defendants. 
* * * * * * * 
Cross-defendant Rocky Mountain State Bank ("RMSB") 
hereby moves for summary judgment in its favor and against 
cross-complainant Fire Insurance Exchange ("FIE") on all causes 
of action set forth in FIE's cross-claim against RMSB. This 
oi^o 
DEFENDANT ROCKY MOUNTAIN 
STATE BANK'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
C i v i l No. C83-1030 
Judge J . D e n n i s F r e d e r i c k 
motion is supported by a Memorandum of Points and Authorities 
filed concurrently herewith. 
DATED this 22^ day of May, 1987. 
G—~ i2o 
JCIS M. WIKSTROM 
DANIEL W. HINDERT 
of and for 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Cross-Defendant, 
Rocky Mountain State Bank 
-2-
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing DEFENDANT ROCKY MOUNTAIN STATE BANK'S MOTION FOR SUM-
MARY JUDGMENT was mailed, postage prepaid, this -^^ ~ day of May, 
1987, to: 
Karen J. McClurg 
KIPP & CHRISTIAN 
175 E. 400 So., #330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Melvin Larew, Jr. 
1200 Beneficial Life Towers 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
John E. Hansen 
MORGAN, SCALLEY & READING 
261 E. 300 So., 2nd Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
John M. Chipman 
BAYLE, HANSON, NELSON & CHIPMAN 
TTOTO Con tl hen't a 1 • Bank~ -Bidg-r— 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Dennis C. Ferguson 
SNOW CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
P. 0. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
And hand-delivered to: 
L. Rich Humpherys 
Christensen, Jensen S> Powell 
510 Clark Learning Building 
Salt Lake City, UT '84101 
Frank A. Roybal 
442 No. Main St. 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
DWH:052287A 
^ - ^ 9 <2cO U dZ^J 
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THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE - STATE OF UTAH 
FILE NO. C-83-1030 
S. LARRY CROKSTON, ET UX, 
VS. 
FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE, ET AL, 
L. RICH HUMPHERYS 
FRANK A. ROYBAL 
CLERK: J. BLY 
REPORTER: S. HELLBERG 
BALLIFF: H. BELL 
HON. J. DENNIS FREDERICK 
DATE: MAY 26, 1987 
THIS CASE COMES NOW ON BEFORE THE COURT FOR MOTIONS. 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN STATE BANK'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
IS ARGUED TO THE COURT AND SUBMITTED. THE COURT GRANTS 
THE MOTION. 
THE DEFENDANT FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE'S MOTION TO 
CONTINUE THE TRIAL IS ARGUED TO THE COURT AND SUBMITTED. 
THE COURT DENIES THE MOTION. 
THE DEFENDANT FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE'S MOTION IN LIMINE 
IS ARGUED TO THE COURT AND SUBMITTED. THE COURT GRANTS 
THE MOTION. 
THE ISSUE OF ATTORNEY'S FEES IS RESERVED. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
S. LARRY CROOKSTON ANO 
RANDI L. CROOKSTON, 
HIS WIFE, 
PLAINTIFFS, 
VS. 
FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE, 
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2 THE COURT: WE HAVE A CIVIL MATTER, WHICH IS SET J 
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3 i FOR TRIAL THIS MORNING, CROOKSTON VS. FIRE INSURANCE 
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EXCHANGE, ET AL. 
COUNSEL IN THAT MATTER, PLEASE STATE YOUR APPEAR-
ANCES. I'M NOT SURE ALL OF YOU ARE HERE, BUT LET'S HEAR 
FROM YOU, WHOEVER IS HERE. 
MR. WIKSTROM: YOUR HONOR, FRANCIS M. WIKSTROM AND 
DAN HINDERT ON BEHALF OF ROCKY MOUNTAIN STATE BANK. 
MR. ROYBAL: FRANK ROYBAL ON BEHALF OF FIRE 
INSURANCE EXCHANGE. 
MR. WIKSTROM: MR. HUMPHERYS IS IN THE HALL. IF 
IT'S THE COURT'S INTENTION TO HEAR OUR MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AT THIS POINT, I'M NOT SURE HIS PRESENCE IS NECES-
SARY. 
THE COURT: THAT MIGHT BE THE CASE. I DO NOT SEE 
HIM HERE, AND MAYBE HE OUGHT TO 8E HERE TO VOICE FOR THE 
RECORD HIS POSITION THAT YOU HAVE REPRESENTED IN YOUR MEMOR-
ANDUM, MR. WIKSTROM. 
MR. WIKSTROM: WOULD YOU LIKE ME TO SEE IF I CAN 
FIND HIM? 
THE COURT: MR. HUMPHERYS, YOU ARE NOW PRESENT IN 
THIS MATTER ON 8EHALF OF THE PLAINTIFFS? 
MR. HUMPHERYS: YES. 
THE COURT: COUNSEL, THIS IS A HEARING THAT'S BEEN) 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICE. INC. 
TEN EXCHANGE PLACE SUITE "i: 
1 i SOUGHT BEFORE WE BRING THE JURY IN, AND I WOULD LIKE TO HAVE 
I 
2 ! YOU STATE FOR THE RECORD, MR. WIKSTROM, YOUR POSITION IN 
3 THIS MATTER, SINCE YOU ARE SEEKING THIS HEARING. 
4 I MR. WIKSTROM: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 8Y WAY OF 
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BACKGROUND, YOUR HONOR, AT ABOUT <+:30 P.M. LAST THURSDAY, 
MR. HUMPHERYS AND I REACHED A SETTLEMENT OF THE PLAINTIFFS' 
CLAIMS AGAINST ROCKY MOUNTAIN STATE BANK. WE, AT THAT 
TIME, EXECUTED A STIPULATION PROVIDING FOR THE DISMISSAL OF 
THE PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS AGAINST THE BANK, AND IMMEDIATELY 
NOTIFIED MR. ROYBAL OF THAT FACT, EVEN THOUGH THE TRUSTEE 
IN BANKRUPTCY, ANNA DRAKE, DID NOT SIGN OFF ON THE STIPULA-
TION AND DID NOT DO SO ON FRIDAY AFTERNOON. 
I THINK THAT'S CRITICAL, I THINK, TO OUR MOTION 
THAT'S PRESENTLY BEFORE THE COURT, AT THAT TIME MR. HUMPHERYS 
CONFIRMED HE WAS NOT PROCEEDING AGAINST THE INSURANCE 
COMPANY ON ANY THEORY OF NEGLIGENCE. IN OTHER WORDS, IT'S 
NOT OUR SETTLEMENT THAT MAKES OUR MOTION APPROPRIATE; IT'S 
HIS ELECTION TO PROCEED AGAINST FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE 
SOLELY ON THE THEORIES OF INTENTIONAL TORT AND BREACH OF 
CONTRACT, BREACH OF INSURANCE CONTRACT INSOFAR AS IT CON-
TAINS AN IMPLIED COVENANTS OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING. 
SO AS THIS CASE WILL GO TO THE JURY THIS MORNING, 
THERE ARE TWO NEGLIGENT CLAIMS, AND PLAINTIFFS WILL STAND 
ON THAT BASIS. IN OTHER WORDS, THERE CAN BE, NOW THAT THEY 
HAVE MADE THE ELECTION, NO RECOVERY AGAINST THE INSURANCE 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICE. INC. 
1 COMPANY 3ASEO ON NEGLIGENCE, ONLY FOR INTENTIONAL TORT OR 
2 BREACH OF CONTRACT. 
AS WE SET FORTH IN OUR MEMORANDUM, SHORT MEMORAN- j 
DUM WHICH WE FILED WITH THE COURT, WE SERVED ON MR. ROYBAL 
LATE FRIDAY EVENING, THERE IS NO BASIS FOR CONTRIBUTION OR 
INDEMNITY FOR EITHER INTENTIONAL TORT OR 8REACH OF CONTRACT 
AND SINCE THAT'S ALL WE HAVE LEFT IN THIS CASE, WE WOULD 
THINK IT'S APPROPRIATE AT THIS POINT THAT THE CROSS-CLAIM 
OF THE INSURANCE COMPANY AGAINST THE BANK BE DISMISSED. 
LIKE I SAY, THE DELAY IS UNFORTUNATE, BUT IT 
WASN'T REALLY A FACTOR SO MUCH OF THE SETTLEMENT, BUT AFTER 
HAVING COMPLETED DISCOVERY AND TAKING A HARD LOOK AT HIS 
THEORIES AND THE EVIDENCE, AND MR. HUMPHERYS AND BOTH HIS 
INSTRUCTIONS AND THEN LATER IN THE LETTER CONFIRMED THAT 
FACT TO US, HAS INDICATED THAT HE'S NOT PROCEEDING ON THE 
PRINCIPLE OF NEGLIGENCE. THERE'S NO WAY, AS I UNDERSTAND 
IT, THAT THE BANK CAN BE LIABLE FOR FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE 
UNDER CONTRIBUTION OR INDEMNITY THEORIES AND THAT'S ALL WE 
HAVE. I DON'T BELIEVE THAT MR. ROYBAL CAN REALLY STAND UP 
AND ARTICULATE ANY BASIS AND KEEP US IN UNDER THAT CROSS-
CLAIM. SO IT'S OUR POSITION THAT THE BANK OUGHT TO BE OUT 
OF THE LAWSUIT, AND THE APPROPRIATE TIME TO DO THAT IS NOW. 
IF V.'E STAY IN, IF WE GET INVOLVED IN THE OPENING 
STATEMENTS AND INVOLVED IN THE EVIDENCE, I ANTICIPATE THERE 
WOULD BE A FAIR AMOUNT OF MUD SLUNG BACK AND FORTH BETWEEN 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICE. INC. 
I 
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1 i THE BANK AND THE INSURANCE COMPANY WHICH IS ONLY GOING TO 
i 
i 
2 ; CONFUSE THE JURY IN THIS CASE, AND PERHAPS CAUSE SOME PR08- i 
i ! 
3 ! LEMS WITH THE RECORD. I DON'T KNOW SPECIFICALLY WHAT THAT j 
* j MIGHT BE, BUT I KNOW WHEN WE GET THREE PARTIES FIGHTING LIKE 
I 
5 | THAT, AND THEN ONE PARTY GETS OUT OF THE LAWSUIT, SAY, AT 
6 j THE CONCLUSION OF THE PLAINTIFF'S CASE, THAT THERE IS A 
POTENTIAL FOR SOME CONFUSION ON THE PART OF THE JURY. SINCE 
THE LEGAL THEORIES, AT LEAST THE AUTHORITIES, SEEM TO BE 
CLEAR ON THE THEORIES OF CONTRIBUTION AND INDEMNITY. WE 
WILL SUBMIT THAT NOW IS THE APPROPRIATE TIME TO CUT THE BANK 
OUT OF THIS CASE. 
THE COURT: THANK YOU, MR. WIKSTROM. I MIGHT STATE, 
FOR THE RECORD, I HAVE REVIEWED THE MEMORANDUM AND AFFIDAVIT 
IN SUPPORT OF THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT FILED ON BEHALfi 
OF THE BANK AGAINST THE INSURANCE CARRIER ON THE CROSS-
CLAIM. 
IS IT ACCURATE, AS FAR AS YOU ARE CONCERNED, 
MR. HUMPHERYS, TO STATE FOR THE RECORD THAT YOUR PLAINTIFFS 
WILL NOT PURSUE, DURING THE COURSE OF THIS TRIAL, ANY CLAIMS 
AGAINST THE INSURANCE CARRIER FOUNDED IN NEGLIGENCE? 
MR. HUMPHERYS: THAT IS CORRECT, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: VERY WELL. MR. ROYBAL? 
MR. ROYBAL: WELL, YOUR HONOR, THE UNFORTUNATE 
THING ABOUT THIS PARTICULAR ASPECT OF THIS CASE IS THE 
TIMING. IT IS VERY DIFFICULT FOR ALL PARTIES TO TAKE THE 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICE. INC. 
» I POSITION ON IT. NUMBER ONE, I HAVE NOT HAD TIME TO GO 
2 ! THROUGH THE MEMORANDUM AND RESEARCH THE ISSUES THAT THE 
3 I BANK HAS RAISED RELATIVE TO WHETHER CONTRIBUTION ANO 
4
 j INDEMNITY GO TO ANYTHING OTHER THAN PURELY NEGLIGENCE, BUT 
5 I WILL SUBMIT TO THE COURT THAT UNDER RULE 56(C), I MUST 
6 BE GIVEN AT LEAST 10 DAYS NOTICE BEFORE THE HEARING IS SET 
7 TO RESPOND TO A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, WHICH IS WHAT 
8 THE BANK HAS FILED, IS A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
9 I HAVE NOT BEEN GIVEN THAT, AND ON THAT GROUND 
10 ALONE, I THINK THE COURT SHOULD NOT REQUIRE ME TO EVEN 
11 RESPOND IN ANY WAY, SHAPE OR FORM TO IT, AND SHOULD THE 
12 BANK TAKE THE POSITION THAT THIS IS A MOTION TO DISMISS 
13 RATHER THAN A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, RULE 2.7(B) OF 
14 THE RULES OF PRACTICE IN THE DISTRICT AND CIRCUIT COURTS 
15 ALSO REQUIRE AT LEAST FIVE DAYS NOTICE PRIOR TO THE NOTICE 
16 OF HEARING WHICH I HAVE NOT HAD. 
17 NUMBER THREE, YOUR HONOR, THE STIPULATION AND 
'8 MOTION AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL ENTERED INTO BY ANO WITH THE 
19 BANK AND THE PLAINTIFFS CLEARLY STATES A BENEFIT, THAT THEY 
20 THROUGH ME, IN THEIR PARAGRAPH 3, THIS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
21 SHALL NOT AFFECT THE CROSS-CLAIMS OF FIRE INSURANCE 
22 EXCHANGE AGAINST THE BANK. THAT'S PRETTY CLEAR. THEY 
23 AGREED TO THAT, AND I WILL TAKE THEM AT THEIR WORD, AND I 
24 I WILL TAKE THEM AT THEIR WRITTEN WORD, AND WE WILL SUBMIT IT 
ON THAT BASIS, YOUR HONOR, BUT I DO NOT WANT THE COURT TO 
LJ 
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1 j CONSTRUE MY REMARKS TO 8E ANYTHING OTHER THAN INFORMING THE i 
! 
2 ; COURT OF WHAT MY POSITION IS RELATIVE TO RULE 56(C), 2.7(B) I 
I 
3 I OF THE RULES OF PRACTICE. 
4 ! IN ADDITION TO THAT, I HAVE BEEN GIVEN BY 
PLAINTIFFS' COUNSEL, AND SHOULD THE COURT CUT THE BANK LOOSE 
FOR SOME OTHER KNOWN REASON ANO NOT REQUIRE THEM TO SIT IN 
THIS, THAT HE'S GOING TO MAKE A MOTION THAT I CANNOT EVEN 
BRING UP ANY FAULT ON THE PART OF THE BANK AT TRIAL, WHICH 
I FIND TO BE LUDICROUS AND UN8ELIEVABLE, BUT NEVERTHELESS, 
THAT'S HIS INTENTION. 
THE COURT: WELL, OF COURSE, MR. R0Y3AL, I WILL 
TAKE THESE ISSUES AS THEY COME. THE WAY WE ARE STRUCTURED 
AT THE MOMENT HERE, IT IS ACCURATE TO STATE THAT THE RULES 
REQUIRE ADDITIONAL TIME THAN WHAT HAS BEEN GIVEN AT THIS 
POINT FOR YOU TO PROPERLY RESPOND. 
DO YOU WISH TO RESPOND TO THAT ARGUMENT, MR. 
WIKSTROM? 
MR. WIKSTROM: YES, YOUR HONOR, JUST BRIEFLY. 
SINCE WE ARE ON THE MORNING OF TRIAL, THERE'S EFFECTIVELY 
NO WAY THAT I CAN GIVE MR. ROYBAL THE APPROPRIATE NOTICE. 
HOWEVER, WITH RESPECT TO THE TIMING, HE FILED THESE CLAIMS 
SOME TIME AGO, AND ONE WOULD EXPECT THAT COUNSEL WOULD KNOW 
WHAT THE LEGAL BASIS FOR HIS THEORY WAS. NEGLIGENCE IS, AS 
THE COURT KNOWS, WAS ONLY A SMALL PART OF THIS CASE AND HAS 
BEEN ONLY A SMALL PART OF THIS CASE FOR SOME TIME. 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICE. INC. 
TEN EXCHANGE PLACE. SUITE * i : 
1 i MR. HUMPHERYS HAS MADE NO SECRET OF THE FACT THAT 
i 
i 
2 ) HIS PRIMARY ISSUE WAS SURROUNDING INTENTIONAL TORT AND 
3 ! 8REACH OF CONTRACT, BUT AS LONG AS NEGLIGENCE WAS IN THERE, ! 
' i 
IT PRECLUDED US FROM BRINGING ANY SORT OF A MOTION FOR \ 
j 
i 
5 I SUMMARY JUDGMENT. | 
6 j SO I WOULD THINK THAT EVEN THOUGH COUNSEL HAS 
7 BEEN SOMEWHAT HAMPERED BY NOT HAVING THIS UNTIL FRIDAY 
8 NIGHT, AND IT'S TUESDAY MORNING, THAT IF THERE WAS ANY LEGAL 
9 BASIS FOR HIM TO KEEP US IN UNDER HIS THEORIES THAT HE 
10 WOULD BE A8LE TO STAND UP AND ARTICULATE THIS TO THE COURT 
U JUST BECAUSE WE CAN'T GET THE TIMING REQUIREMENTS OF THE 
12 I RULES, IT DOESN'T SEEM THAT WE OUGHT TO TAKE THE RISK OF 
13 i AFFECTING THE RECORD IN THIS CASE, NUMBER ONE, OR FORCING 
14 THE BANK TO SIT THROUGH AT MINIMUM THE PLAINTIFF'S CASE, 
15 WHICH PROBABLY MR. HUMPHREYS CASE WILL GO INTO NEXT WEEK 
16 SOMETIME, AT GREAT EXPENSE TO THE BANK, SIMPLY TO EXALT 
17 THE TIME REQUIREMENT OF THE RULES. 
18 I BELIEVE THE COURT HAS INHERENT AUTHORITY AS 
19 LONG AS THERE'S NO SUBSTANTIAL PREJUOICE SHOWN TO DEAL WITH 
20 THIS MATTER ON THAT BASIS. ONE OTHER THING I WOULD POINT 
21 OUT, YOUR HONOR, I AGREE WITH MR. ROYBAL, THE SETTLEMENT 
22 WITH THE BANK AND THE CROOKSTONS DOES NOT AFFECT THE CROSS-
23 CLAIM. IT'S ONLY THE ELECTION OF REMEDIES 8Y MR. HUMPHERYS 
24 THAT WE CONTENO AFFECTS THE CROSS-CLAIM. 
25 MR. ROYBAL: YOUR HONOR, I WOULD LIKE TO JUST 
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1
 . SPEAK A WORD HERE. IN THE TIME I WAS INVOLVED IN THE CASE, 
I 
2
 • WHEN I FILED THE AMENDED COMPLAINT AND UP THROUGH THE TIME 
, I 3
 • OF THE FILING OF THE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT, I HAVE NOT 
i 
4
 ; PLED ANY THEORY OF NEGLIGENCE. I HAVE PURPOSELY NOT PLED 
5
 I THIS TO AVOID THE CONTEXT OF COMPARATIVE FAULT AND COMPARA-
6
 j TIVE NEGLIGENCE. I PLED A CAUSE OF ACTION ENTITLED TORT 
7
 OF INTENDED CONSEQUENCES, WHICH I INTERPRET IT TO 8E AN 
8 I INTENTIONAL.TORT AND ONE THAT IS RATHER OBSCURE IN THE 
RESTATEMENT THAT EVEN THAT CAUSE OF ACTION I AM DROPPING 
AND LEAVING ONLY THE ISSUES OF BREACH OF CONTRACT, THE 
EXPRESS TERMS, BREACH OF THE IMPLIED TERMS OF GOOD FAITH, 
FRAUO, MISREPRESENTATION, AND FINALLY THE INTENTIONAL TORT 
OF OUTRAGE. 
MR. ROYBAL: YOU FORGOT TO MENTION LIBEL AND 
TORTIOUS CONDUCT, COUNSEL, THE ELEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION. 
MR. HUMPHERYS: IN ANY EVENT — 
THE COURT: THE ESSENTIAL POINT BEING THAT THERE 
ARE CLAIMS OTHER THAN THOSE CATEGORIZED AS INTENTIONAL 
TORT OR BREACH OF CONTRACT? 
MR. HUMPHERYS: THAT IS CORRECT, AND FINALLY THOSE 
ARE THE ONLY CAUSES OF ACTION WE ARE PROCEEDING UNDER. 
THE COURT: MR. R0Y8AL, YOU HAVE HAD THE MOTION 
AND MEMORANDUM, IN SPITE OF IT, SINCE FRIDAY LAST? 
MR. ROYBAL: 9 O'CLOCK IN THE EVENING. 
THE COURT: WHAT IS YOUR THEORY, IF ANY, AGAINST 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICE. INC. 
TEN EXCHANGE PLACE. SUITE " i : 
' THE BANK WITH REGARD TO THE iNOEMNiTY OR CONTRIBUTION? 
2 MR. ROYBAL: I REALLY HAVEN'T HAD TIME TO EXPLORE 
3 , WHAT MY THEORIES WOULD BE, YOUR HONOR, EXCEPT THAT I WILL 
4
 ' REPRESENT TO THE COURT THAT I THINK THE COMMON LAW THEORY 
5 j OF LIABILITY WOULD EXTENO IN THIS PARTICULAR CASE. THAT'S 
6 j JUST MY INITIAL REACTION TO THE MEMORANDUM, HAVING PERSON-
7 i ALLY READ IT. 
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ALSO, I BELIEVE THAT SHOULD THE CROSS-CLAIM BE 
DISMISSED, THAT I SHOULD HAVE A RIGHT TO FILE A THIRD-PARTY 
COMPLAINT AGAINST THE BANK, SHOULD—AFTER I HAVE HAD AN 
OPPORTUNITY TO REVIEW ALL OF MY OPPORTUNITIES FOR OPTIONS 
FOR VARIOUS CAUSES OF ACTION, THAT I MAY WANT TO BRING THE 
BANK IN TO INDEMNIFY FOR US THEIR ACTIONS AS AGAINST THE 
PLAINTIFF. THERE'S AMPLE EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD IN THE 
MOTIONS STATED BY THE PLAINTIFFS THAT THEY KNOW THAT THE 
BANK HAD DONE A NUMBER OF THINGS TO THEM THAT THEY FELT 
CAUSED THEM HARM, WHETHER THEY COMPORT TO LEGAL THEORIES OF 
THEIR COUNSEL, I DON'T KNOW, BUT I THINK THEIR TESTIMONY IS 
PRESENT HERE, THAT THEY WERE UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT THE 
BANK, NUMBER ONE, WAS HANDLING THEIR ENTIRE AFFAIRS RELA-
TIVE TO THE CONSTRUCTION, FOR ONE THING, AND AS A RESULT, 
THERE IS A RELIANCE TO THEIR DETRIMENT, AND THERE'S JUST 
ONE OTHER ISSUE THAT POSSIBLY I CAN BRING UP WITH A LITTLE 
MORE THOROUGH ANALYSIS, AND THAT IS THE DISTRIBUTIONS BY THE 
BANK TO THE GENERAL CONTRACTOR, THE SUBCONTRACTORS, AND TO 
10 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICE. INC. 
TEN EXCHANGE PLACE SUTE " i ; 
THE PLAINTIFFS THEMSELVES ANO WHETHER OR NOT--
2 , THE COURT: WELL, YOUR CROSS-CLAIM AGAINST THE 
3 . BANK, ALLEGING CONTRIBUTION ANO INDEMNIFICATION, HAS 8EEN 
-» j OF RECORD FOR SOME CONSIDERABLE TIME; HAS IT NOT? 
5 MR. ROYBAL: THAT IS CORRECT. 
6 I THE COURT: AND YOU AGREE, DO YOU NOT, WITH THE 
7 I PROPOSITION THAT THERE IS NO CLAIM AGAINST THE BANK OVER 
8 ON YOUR CROSS-CLAIM OTHER THAN FOR CONTRIBUTION INOEMNIFICA-
9 TION? DO YOU AGREE WITH THAT? 
10 MR. ROYBAL: I WOULD AGREE TO THAT. 
11 I THE COURT: IT APPEARS TO ME, COUNSEL, THAT WHILE 
12 j THE TIMING ISSUE IS ONE OF SOME IMPORTANCE, HOWEVER, OF 
13 j COURSE, OUR LOCAL RULES OF PRACTICE ALLOWS FOR THIS COURT 
14 TO HEAR MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN LESS THAN THE 
15 I TYPICAL 30 DAYS PRIOR TO THE COURT HEARING, PRIOR TO THE 
16 ! TRIAL, DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS. 
17 THE QUESTION OF COMPLIANCE, HOWEVER, WITH THE 
18 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 56(C) IS AT THIS STAGE AN IMPOSSI-
19 BILITY BY VIRTUE OF THE FACT THAT WE HAVE THE JURY HERE THIS 
20 MORNING, AND THESE EVENTS, I TAKE IT, AROSE TO SOME EXTENT 
21 BY VIRTUE OF THE SETTLEMENT HAVING BEEN AFFECTED, AND IT 
22 FURTHER APPEARS TO ME THAT THE ARGUMENT RAISED IN THE 
23 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS 
24 REALLY NOT ALL THAT COMPLEX. I AM JUST INQUIRING, SINCE YOU 
25 HAVE HAD, MR. ROYBAL, SOME DAYS TO REVIEW THIS MATTER, WHAT 
i 1 1 
I
 : 
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1 YOU ARE SAYING TO ME. AT LEAST, IT APPEARS TO ME THAT IF YOU 
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4 i THAN THE CONTRIBUTION AND INDEMNIFICATION THEORIES THAT ARE 
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ALREADY EXISTENT IN YOUR CROSS-CLAIM? 
MR. R0Y8AL: I'M NOT SAYING THAT, YOUR HONOR. 
I HAVEN'T HAD TIME TO EXPLORE ALL THEORIES, AND, IF I WOULD 
FILE A THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT, AT LEAST I WOULD BE GIVEN THE 
OPPORTUNITY TO DO SO, AND I HAVEN'T EXPLORED ALL THOSE 
THEORIES, BUT I CAN RELATE TO THE COURT THAT THEY WOULD NOT 
BE STRICTLY CONTRIBUTION AND/OR INDEMNITY. 
THE COURT: YOU HAVE NOT HERETOFORE SOUGHT TO 
AMEND YOUR CROSS-CLAIM TO ADD ADDITIONAL THEORIES? 
MR. ROYBAL: THAT IS CORRECT, BUT I HAVE NEVER HAD 
ANY REASON TO UP TO THIS POINT. 
THE COURT: THINKING THAT THE CLAIM OF CONTRIBU-
TION AND/OR INDEMNIFICATION WAS SUFFICIENT IN YOUR JUDGMENT 
AGAINST THE BANK? 
MR. ROYBAL: SAME AS THE BANK'S WAS AGAINST MINE. 
THEY HAVE EXACTLY THE SAME THEORIES AGAINST ME ON YOUR 
CROSS-CLAIMS, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: IS THERE ANYTHING FURTHER IN THIS 
MATTER, GENTLEMEN, THAT YOU WISH TO ADD? 
MR. WIKSTROM: NO, YOUR HONOR. 
MR. HUMPHERYS: NOTHING FURTHER, YOUR HONOR. 
12 
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 ; THE COURT: I AM OF THE VIEW THAT IN LIGHT OF THE 
2 I EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES THAT HAVE NOW SEEN PROMPTED PRINCI-
I 
I 
3 i PALLY BY A RESULT OF THE SETTLEMENT THAT THE OPPORTUNITY TO 
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 | RESPONO, AS PROVIDED IN THE RULES, CAN BE AND SHOULD APPRO-
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PRIATELY BE WAIVED IN LIGHT OF WHAT I DEEM TO BE NO SHOWING 
OF UNFAIR PREJUOICE TO-A PARTY, AND, ACCORDINGLY, THE NOTICE 
REQUIREMENT IS WAIVED. IT'S MY JUDGMENT THAT BEING TUESDAY, 
THAT THERE HAS BEEN SOME ADEQUATE OR AT LEAST AVAILA3LE TIME 
WITHIN WHICH MR. R0Y8AL, THE MEMORANDUM, WHICH IS NOT 
LENGTHY IN THIS MATTER, COULD HAVE BEEN REVIEWED AND AN 
ARGUMENT AT LEAST PRESENTED TO THIS COURT AS TO WHAT ADDI-
TIONAL THEORIES YOU THOUGHT MIGHT BE APPROPRIATE OR WHAT 
EVIDENCE MIGHT BE APPROPRIATE TO ALLOW YOU TO ASSERT A 
CROSS-CLAIM FOR CONTRIBUTION OR INDEMNITY. 
THEREFORE, IT IS MY VIEW, COUNSEL, IN LIGHT OF 
THE SETTLEMENT THAT'S BEEN EFFECTED AND THE ARGUMENTS THAT 
HAVE BEEN PRESENTED HERE, THAT THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT IS GRANTED, AND I THINK THAT, TOO, IN LIGHT OF WHAT 
APPEARS TO ME TO 8E A VERY SLIM, IF ANY, LIKELIHOOD OF ANY 
BASIS FOR ASSERTING A CROSS-CLAIM OR INDEMNIFICATION AGAINST 
THE BANK THAT SERVES TO MERELY UNDULY PROLONG THESE PRO-
CEEDINGS AND THE ISSUES THAT THE JURY WILL HAVE TO CONSIDER, 
IN ANY EVENT. SO THE BANK'S MOTION IS GRANTED. 
MR. WIKSTROM: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. MAY I 
ORALLY MOVE, AT THIS TIME, TO DISMISS THE BANK'S CROSS-
13 
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TEN EXCHANGfc PLACE ?UTt " i : 
1 I CLAIM AGAINST THE INSURANCE COMPANY AND PROVIDE AN ORDER TO 
THE COURT TO THAT EFFECT? 
THE COURT: I PRESUME THERE'S NO RESISTANCE TO 
THAT REQUEST? 
MR. ROYBAL: NO. WE WOULD ALSO MOVE FOR A CON-
TINUANCE, YOUR HONOR, AT THIS TIME, IN ORDER TO EXPLORE THE 
THEORIES OF A THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT AGAINST THE BANK. 
THE COURT: FIRST OF ALL, YOUR MOTION TO WITHDRAW 
THE CROSS-CLAIM AGAINST THE CARRIER, MR. WIKSTROM, IS 
GRANTED. SECONDLY, FOR THE RECORD, I WILL EXECUTE NOW YOUR 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH REGARD TO THE QUESTION OF THE 
SETTLEMENT HAVING BEEN RAISED WITH THE BANK AND THE 
PLAINTIFFS. 
DO YOU RECALL THE APPROXIMATE DATE, MR. ROYBAL, 
THAT YOU FILED YOUR CROSS-CLAIM AGAINST THE BANK? YOUR 
AMENDED ANSWER TO THE PLAINTIFF'S FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT 
WAS FILED BACK IN JULY OF 1986. 
MR. ROYBAL: THERE WAS A CROSS-CLAIM FILED IN 
DECEMBER OF '86, YOUR HONOR, DECEM8ER 3RD. 
MR. HUMPHERYS: I THINK, YOUR HONOR, THERE WAS 
ANOTHER CROSS-CLAIM FILED BEFORE THAT. THERE WAS A—I'M 
NOT POSITIVE, FRANK. 
MR. ROYBAL: THAT IS CORRECT. THERE WAS—INITIALS] 
THERE WAS, WHEN THE INITIAL PLEADINGS BEGAN. 
THE COURT: WHEN WAS THE INITIAL CROSS-CLAIM 
1<+ 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICE. INC. 
1 : FILED, AS BEST YOU CAN REMEMBER, MR. ROY3AL? 
I 
i 
2 : MR. ROY8AL: I'M SURE IT WAS FILED WHEN WE FILED 
3 | OUR ANSWER TO THE INITIAL COMPLAINT. 
4 ; THE COURT: WHICH WOULD HAVE BEEN? 
5 I MR. ROYBAL: WAY BACK IN 1983-
6 j THE COURT: ALL RIGHT, AND SINCE THAT TIME, YOU 
I 
7 | HAVE MADE NO REQUEST TO THIS COURT TO AMEND TO ASSERT 
ADDITIONAL OR OTHER THEORIES THAN THE CONTRIBUTION AND 
INDEMNIFICATION? 
MR. ROYBAL: NO. THE RECORD IS CLEAR ON THAT. 
THE COURT: YOUR REQUEST, NOW, IS TO CONTINUE, 
FOR PURPOSES OF— 
MR. ROYBAL: TO EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITY OF FILING 
A THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT IN AS SHORT A TIME AS POSSIBLE. 
THE COURT: I THINK, COUNSEL—DO YOU WISH TO 
RESPOND TO THAT, MR. HUMPHERYS? 
MR. HUMPHERYS: YES, YOUR HONOR. THE ONLY THING 
THAT, IN MY KNOWLEDGE, HAS BEEN RAISED AS IT RELATES TO A 
THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT IS TO HAVE, UNDER THE NEW STATUTE, 
THE ISSUE OF PROPORTIONATE FAULT LITIGATED IN THE SAME 
ACTION. I'M UNAWARE OF ANY OTHER THEORY WHICH HAS BEEN 
ADVANCED OR SUGGESTED BY DEFENDANT'S COUNSEL. 
FOR THE PURPOSE OF FILING THAT THIRD-PARTY 
COMPLAINT, FIRST OF ALL, YOUR HONOR, THE NEW STATUTE, I 
THINK, CLEARLY DOES NOT HAVE RETROACTIVE APPLICATON. SECOND 
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1 . OF ALL, EVEN IF IT DID, CERTAINLY THAT WAS WITHIN THE REALMS1 
2 ' AND CONTEMPLATION OF THE CROSS-CLAIM AND WAS THE VERY INTENTJ 
3 i AND PURPOSE OF THE CROSS-CLAIM, WAS TO HAVE PROPORTIONATE I 
i ; 
* i FAULT LITIGATED. j 
I 
5 | YOUR HONOR, IF THE COURT HAS DETERMINED THAT THEREJ 
6 I IS SOME RESPONSIBILITY ON THE PART OF THE BANK TO THE 
I 
7 INSURANCE COMPANY BY WAY OF A CROSS-CLAIM, THERE WOULD BE ! 
8 A DEEP PREJUDICE, SIGNIFICANT PREJUDICE AFTER FIVE YEARS 
9 FROM THE DATE OF THE WRONGFUL ACTION NOW TO CONTINUE THE 
10 TRIAL FURTHER FOR PURPOSES OF ALLOWING THEM TO BRING A 
11 THIRD-PARTY ACTION, WHICH THEY HAVE HAD AMPLE TIME TO CON-
12 SIDER AND REVIEW OVER THE PAST THREE YEARS. 
13 FINALLY, YOUR HONOR, IT SEEMS TO ME THAT IF THERE 
14 IS GROUNDS FOR SOME THEORY OF WHICH I DO NOT KNOW, OR ELSE 
15 I WOULD NOT HAVE ENTERED INTO THIS AGREEMENT ANTICIPATING 
16 THAT THIS WOULD HAPPEN, IF THERE WAS SOME GROUNDS WHICH THE 
17 INSURANCE COMPANY CAN ASSERT AGAINST THE SANK FOR SOME TYPE 
18 OF A CLAIM, AND IT HAS TO BE SOME THEORY OF CONTRIBUTION, 
19 OF SOME SORT, UNDER THE THEORY, THEN, YOUR HONOR, IT APPEARS 
20 THAT THEY HAVE NOT BEEN PREJUDICED BY ALLOWING THEM TO 
21 PROCEED AT SUCH TIME AS THEY CAN PROVIDE A CLAIM. 
22 THE STATUTE IS CLEAR THAT IF THERE IS SUCH A 
23 CLAIM, THEY ARE NOT REQUIRED OR TIME-BARRED UNTIL THEY 
24 HAVE PAID EITHER MORE THAN THEIR PROPORTIONATE SHARE OR PAID 
25 SOME AMOUNT FOR WHICH THEY CAN SEEK INDEMNIFICATION, AND 
16 I 
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1 FOR THAT REASON, THEY SUFFER NO DAMAGES UNTIL THEY ARE 
2
 t REQUIRED TO RESPOND TO THE PLAINTIFFS, IN WHICH CASE THEY 
3 I CAN BRING THEIR CLAIM THEREAFTER, AND IF THEY CAN FIND SUCH 
I 
4 j A CLAIM, THEY CAN BRING IT AND ASSERT IT IN WHATEVER FASHION 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
IS 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
2S 
THEY WILL, BUT THERE'S NO JUSTIFICATION FOR THE PROCEEDINGS 
HERE TO BE DEFERRED ANY LONGER. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT, MR. HUMPHERYS. MR. ROYBAL, 
DO YOU WISH TO SAY ANYTHING? 
MR. ROYBAL: WELL, YOUR HONOR, IF THE STATUTES 
THAT ARE IN EFFECT TODAY WERE IN EFFECT WHEN THIS CASE WAS 
ORIGINALLY FILED, I WOULD HAVE BEEN ABLE TO MAINTAIN OTHER 
DEFENDANTS IN THIS ACTION THAT I THINK ARE ABSOLUTELY 
CULPABLE RELATIVE TO THE DAMAGE THE PLAINTIFF SUFFERED, 
THAT BEING THE THREE INDIVIDUALS WHO I SUED UNDER A THIRD-
PARTY COMPLAINT TO BEGIN WITH. THE COURT IS AWARE OF ALL 
OF THE 8ANTERING BACK AND FORTH THAT'S GONE ON, BUT I 
BELIEVE THE COURT, AS WELL AS OTHER COURTS IN THE THIRD 
DISTRICT, ARE TAKING THE POSITION THAT THE TORT REFORM ACT 
IS NOT APPLICABLE IN A RETROACTIVE MANNER. 
THEREFORE, WE ARE STILL FUNCTIONING UNDER THE 
OLD RULE WHICH ALLOWS FOR THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINTS AND IF 
ANY THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT ALLEGES AN ACTION FOR NEGLIGENCE, 
THAT'S MY RIGHT, UNDER THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, AND 
IF I'M NOT GIVEN AN OPPORTUNITY TO DO THAT, I--ESPECI ALLY 
AFTER TODAY'S RULING, I CONSIDER MYSELF EXTREMELY VULNERABLE 
17 
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6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
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1 J AND PREJUDICED BY ALL THAT'S OCCURRED UP TO THIS POINT TO 
2 • DENY ME THE RIGHT TO ASSERT AN ACTION AGAINST THE BANK. 
I 
3 j I THINK IT IS SEVERELY PREJUDICING MY CLIENT. 
4 I THE COURT: I MIGHT STATE, WHILE WE'RE ON THE 
RECORD HERE, GENTLEMEN, THAT THE DECISION THAT I MADE WITH 
REGARD TO THE REQUEST FOR A DE FACTO SEVERENCE WAS BASED ON 
THE FACT THAT IT WOULD TENO TO CONFUSE THE JURY WITH REGARD 
TO THE ISSUES IN THE PRESENT CASE, THAT SPECIFICALLY BEING 
AN INTENTIONAL TORT, WRONGFUL REFUSAL TO SETTLE AND BREACH 
OF CONTRACT CLAIM. 
IT SEEMS TO ME TO SERVE NO VALID PURPOSE TO TRY 
THE ENTIRE CASE AT THIS TIME. BY THE ENTIRE CASE, I MEAN 
IN ADDITION TO THE THIRD-PARTY CLAIMS OFFERED FOR NEGLIGENCE. 
MR. ROYBAL, THERE HAVE BEEN ASSERTED, ACCORDINGLY, 
THAT WAS THE RATIONALE FOR MY RULING ON THAT SPECIFIC ISSUE. 
HOWEVER, OF COURSE, YOUR CLAIMS FOR NEGLIGENCE AGAINST 
VARIOUS SUBS, CONTRACTORS, ETC., ARE VIABLE, AND THEY WILL 
BE TRIED AT THE CONCLUSION OF THIS INITIAL PHASE OF THE 
TRIAL. 
SO YOUR POSITION WITH REGARD TO CLAIMS FOR 
NEGLIGENCE IN THE CREATION OF THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES, REALLY, 
WILL BE RESERVED. 
MR. ROYBAL: AGAINST THOSE DEFENDANTS, BUT NOT 
AGAINST THE BANK, YOUR HONOR? 
THE COURT: WELL, THAT ASPECT OF THE CLAIM IS 
18 
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TEN EXCHANGE PLACE. SUITE " i : 
1 I PENDING INSOFAR AS THE NEGLIGENT TORT-FEASORS YOU ARE 
I 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
IS 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
ALLEGING CAUSED THE CAVE-IN. 
SO THE BANK'S MOTION BEFORE ME THIS MORNING IS 
BASED STRICTLY UPON THE AFFIDAVIT THAT THERE IS NO CONTRIBU-
TION ON THE INDEMNIFICATION ON ANY THEORY, SO THE MOTION, 
| THEREFORE, TO CONTINUE THE TRIAL IS DENIED. 
NOW, BEFORE WE BRING THE JURY IN, COUNSEL— 
MR. R0Y8AL: I WOULD LIKETOMOVE, YOUR HONOR, AT 
THIS TIME, ALSO, TOO, IN ADDITION TO DISMISSING THE SEVENTH 
CAUSE OF ACTION, WHICH I TAKE IT MR. HUMPHERYS HAS 
ACQUIESCED TO, ACTING IN CONCERT, WHICH IT NO LONGER HAS 
ANY RELEVANCE TO THIS CASE, AND ALSO THE TENTH CAUSE OF 
ACTION, WHICH HE INDICATED HE WAS WILLING TO DROP, WILL 8E 
NO INTENDED CONSEQUENCES, AND THE ELEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION, 
LIABILITY FOR TORTIOUS CONDUCT. I WOULD LIKE THOSE NOTED, 
WHAT THOSE ARE, IF THEY HAVE ANY RELEVANCE TO THE COURT'S 
RULING. 
MR. WIKSTROM: YOUR HONOR, WE ARE DISMISSING THOSE 
CAUSES OF ACTION. SO I'M NOT EXACTLY SURE WE ARE PROCEEDING 
ON FOUR THEORIES. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT, THAT SETTLES THAT. 
MR. WIKSTROM: MAY WE BE EXCUSED, YOUR HONOR? 
THE COURT: MR. WIKSTROM, YOU MAY BE EXCUSED. 
NOW, YOU FILED A MOTION IN LIMINE, MR. ROYBAL. 
LET'S DEAL WITH THAT. I HAVE REVIEWED THE MOTION. 
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FRANCIS M. WIKSTROM (A3462) 
DANIEL W. HINDERT (A1497) 
of and for 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Rocky Mountain State Bank 
185 South State Street, Suite 700 
P.O. Box 11893 
Salt Lake City, UT 84147-0898 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * 
S. LARRY CROOKSTON and RAND I 
L. CROOKSTON, as individuals, 
and ANNA W. DRAKE, as Trustee 
of the Estate of S. Larry 
Crookston and Randi L. 
Crookston, 
Plaintiffs. 
vs. 
FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE, a 
California corporation, and 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN STATE BANK, 
a Utah corporation, 
Defendants, Cross-
complainants and 
Cross-defendants. 
* * * * * * * 
Cross-defendant Rocky Mountain State Bank's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, having come before the Court on Tuesday, 
May 26, 1987, Francis M. Wikstrom and Daniel W. Hindert appearing 
on behalf of Rocky Mountain State Bank, Frank A. Roybal appearing 
on behalf of cross-complainant Fire Insurance Exchange (the 
ORDER 
Civil No. C83-1030 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
"Insurance Co."), and L. Rich Humpherys appearing on behalf of 
plaintiffs; the Court having reviewed the Motion and Supporting 
Memorandum, having confirmed that said pleadings were served upon 
attorneys for plaintiffs and the Insurance Co, on Friday evening, 
May 22, 1987, having heard an objection by counsel for Insurance 
Co. as to the timeliness of this Motion and hearing on same, 
having waived the timing requirement on grounds that the basis 
for said Motion did not arise until a settlement had been reached 
between plaintiffs and the Bank on May 21 or 22, 1987, and having 
found that no unfair prejudice would result from waiver of the 
timing requirement for hearing and ruling on said Motion; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
cross-defendant Rocky Mountain State Bank's Motion for Summary 
judgment: is granted and, further, that the crossclaim of the 
Insurance Co, against Rocky Mountain State Bank in the captioned 
action is hereby dismissed with prejudice. Pursuant to Rule 54B 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, this Court finds that there 
is no just cause for delay and hereby certifies the Order as 
final, 
DATED this Jftday of .IVM . 1987. 
BY THE tfOURT: 
mjjid 
NIS ERBDfirilCK 
CT COURT JUDGE 
TTFEST 
N*;>- OLEY 
-2- / In I J -*« 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
zd 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing proposed ORDER was mailed, postage prepaid, this 2.K 
day of May, 1987, to: 
L. Rich Humpherys 
Christensen, Jensen & Powell 
510 Clark Learning Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Frank A. Roybal 
442 No. Main St. 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Karen J. McClurg 
KIPP & CHRISTIAN 
17S E. 400 So., #330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Melvin Larew, Jr. 
1200 Beneficial Life Towers 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
322:052787A 
Johh~E. Hansen 
MORGAN, SCALLEY & READING 
261 E. 300 So., 2nd Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
John M. Chipman 
Lewis B. Quigley 
BAYLE, HANSON, NELSON & CHIPMAN 
1300 Continental Bank Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Dennis C. Ferguson 
SNOW CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
P. 0. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
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[This is an excerpt from Appellant's Brief, Utah 
Supreme Court Appeal No. 870252] 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR 
IN FAILING TO ALLOW FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE 
ADEQUATE OPPORTUNITY TO RESPOND TO THE 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
The bank served its motion for summary judgment and 
memorandum in support of its motion for summary judgment on Friday, 
May 22, 1987, the day prior to the start of a three-day Memorial 
Day weekend. On May 26, 1987, just five calendar days and one 
working day after the bank served its motion for summary judgment, 
the motion was granted by the trial court. Furthermore, argument 
on the motion for summary judgment was held, despite objection by 
counsel for Fire Insurance Exchange, just one hour prior to the 
scheduled six-day trial of the case. The granting of the bank's 
motion for summary judgment without allowing the opposing party 
adequate time to respond constitutes reversible error. 
Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides 
non-moving parties at least ten days1 notice of the hearing on a 
motion for summary judgment: 
-10-
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. 
The motion shall be served at least ten days 
before the time fixed for the hearing. The 
adverse party prior to the day of hearing 
may serve opposing affidavits. 
Although some courts have found the ten-day notice 
requirement of Rule 56(c) to be jurisdictional, the Utah Supreme 
Court in Walker v. Rocky Mountain Recreation Corp., 29 Utah 2d 274, 
508 P.2d 538, 541 (1973), held that the notice provision of U.R.C.P. 
56(c) is not jurisdictional. See also, Western States Thrift & 
Loan Co. v. Blomquist, 29 Utah 2d 58, 504 P.2d 1019, 1021 (1972); 
and Security Title Co. v. Payless Builders Supply, 17 Utah 2d 179, 
407 P.2d 141, 142 (1965). But see, Torres v. First State Bank, 550 
F.2d 1255 (10th Cir. 1977); Adams v. Campbell County School Dist., 
483 F.2d 1351 (10th Cir. 1973); Mustang Fuel Corp. v. Youngstown 
Sheet & Tube Co., 480 F.2d 607 (10th Cir. 1973); and Enochs v. 
Sisson, 301 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1962). 
In Jensen v. Eames, 30 Utah 2d 423, 519 P.2d 236, 238 
(1974), the court noted that the time limitation and notice 
provisions of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are not hard and 
fast rules. While trial courts are afforded some discretion in 
waiving procedural notice requirements, it is clear that under 
certain circumstances a trial court's failure to require strict 
compliance with the rules warrants reversal. See Mickelson v. 
Shelley, 542 P.2d 740, 742 (Utah 1975) (trial court abused its 
discretion where defendants were required to go to trial without 
adequate notice of the trial date). See also, Hein's Turkey 
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Hatcheries, Inc. v. Nephi Processing Plant, Inc., 24 Utah 2d 271, 
470 P.2d 257 (1970) (defendant's motion for summary judgment filed 
on day of trial held untimely). 
The Utah Supreme Court's adoption of a harmless error 
standard in dealing with non-compliance with procedural time 
limitation and notice provisions means that a trial court's ruling 
will not be disturbed absent objection to the timing or notice of 
the hearing. Walker, 508 P.2d at 541. In addition, a trial 
court's ruling dispensing with a notice requirement will not be 
reversed unless the party opposing the motion can demonstrate 
prejudice. Western States Thrift & Loan Co., 504 P.2d at 1021. 
Prejudice, at least in part, is determined by whether the party had 
"actual notice and time to prepare to meet the questions raised by 
the motion of an adversary." Jensen, 519 P.2d at 238. 
The prejudicial effect of not affording a party adequate 
time to defend against a dispositive motion, filed on the eve of 
trial, was noted by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Beck v. 
Borden, Inc., 724 F.2d 44 (6th Cir. 1984). In Beck, the 
plaintiff's former employee brought an action against his employer, 
alleging that it negligently failed to make contributions on his 
behalf to a union pension fund. The trial court set a trial date 
of January 24, 198 3. Defendant's motion for summary judgment was 
filed and served on counsel for the plaintiff on January 17, 1983. 
The trial court gave plaintiff until 4:00 p.m. on January 19, 1983, 
to respond. Plaintiff objected that such short notice placed an 
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unreasonable and unfair burden on him to prepare an adequate 
response. The district court granted the plaintiff's motion for 
summary judgment on January 24, 1983. 
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that he was entitled to 
reversal because of the trial court's failure to follow the 
requirements of Rule 56(c). In response, the defendant contended 
that Rule 56(c) was flexible and that any error of the trial court 
was harmless because plaintiff had failed to show any prejudice. 
In reversing and remanding the action for further 
proceedings, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals stated: 
Upon consideration of the briefs and oral 
arguments of counsel together with the 
record on appeal this court concludes that 
the district court committed reversible 
error in this case. In Kistner v. Califano, 
579 F.2d 1004, 1006 (6th Cir. 1978), we dis-
cussed the time requirement of Rule 56(c): 
Noncompliance with the time provision 
of the rule deprives the court of 
authority to grant summary judgment, 
Adams v. Campbell County School Dist., 
483 F.2d 1351 (10th Cir. 1973), unless 
the opposing party has waived this 
requirement, United States v. Miller, 
318 F.2d 637 (7th Cir. 1963), or there 
has been no prejudice to the opposing 
party by the court's failure to comply 
with this provision of the rule. 
Oppenheimer v. Morton Hotel Corp., 324 
F.2d 766 (6th Cir. 1963) . 
There is no indication that the plaintiff 
waived the requirement in the present case 
and his memorandum in opposition set forth a 
claim of prejudice. Plaintiff was entitled 
to ten days to prepare a response to the 
motion. The fact that Borden waited so late 
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to file its motion for summary judgment put 
the trial court in a difficult position. In 
the absence of a waiver by the plaintiff of 
the ten-day requirement of Rule 56(c) the 
district court should have either denied the 
motion or set it for hearing ten days hence, 
reserving any ruling until that time. It is 
generally held that motions for summary 
judgment are inappropriate on the eve of 
trial. See Management Investors v. United 
Mine Workers of America, 610 F.2d 384, 389 
(6th Cir. 1979) . 
Beck, 724 F.2d at 45 (emphasis added). 
Courts generally limit the harmless error rule to 
extraordinary cases in which it is clear that the nonmoving party 
suffered no prejudice from a shortening of the time to respond. 
Due to the dispositive nature of summary judgment motions, 
appellate courts have encouraged strict compliance with the time 
provisions of Rule 56(c). In Finn v. Gunter, 722 F.2d 711 (11th 
Cir. 1984), the court reviewed a district court's sua sponte action 
converting a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss into a summary 
judgment motion without affording the nonmoving party the ten-day 
notice required by Rule 56(c) before granting partial summary 
judgment. In reversing and remanding the action, the court stated: 
It is clear why we strictly follow the 
notice requirement of Rule 56. A motion to 
dismiss may result in a rejection of the 
complaint but it does not finally resolve 
the case. When this type of motion is 
before the court counsel are generally 
addressing questions of law. A summary 
judgment, on the other hand, carries far 
greater impact since it results in a final 
adjudication of the merits. "The very 
intimation of mortality when summary judg-
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ment is at issue assures us that the motion 
will be rebutted with every factual and 
legal argument available.ff Georgia Southern 
& Florida Railway Co. v. Atlantic Railroad, 
37 3 F.2d at 498. Appellee argues that Finn 
has already provided everything that he 
could. Appellant says there is additional 
material that can and will be filed. What 
is important is that Finn must be given an 
opportunity to present every factual and 
legal argument available. Proper procedures 
must be followed. 
Id. at 713. 
Courts have likewise restricted the application of the 
harmless error rule where a party petitions for waiver of the 
time and notice requirements of Rule 56(c) on the eve of trial. In 
Gutwein v. Roche Laboratories, 739 F.2d 93 (2d Cir. 1984), the 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals was asked to review the trial 
court's granting of summary judgment where the motion was filed 
only five days before trial. In Gutwein, the plaintiff brought 
suit against the defendant drug manufacturer claiming that the 
defendant's products caused him to lose his eyesight. The parties 
engaged in discovery over a three-year period. Trial was 
eventually set for September 12, 198 3. On September 7, five days 
before the trial, defendant moved for summary judgment based on 
lack of evidence on the issues of causation and duty to warn. In 
opposing the motion for summary judgment, plaintiff's counsel 
submitted medical literature suggesting a causal link between the 
plaintiff's injuries and the defendant's product. In addition, 
plaintiff's counsel argued that the short notice precluded him from 
obtaining supporting affidavits in opposition to the motion. After 
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a hearing on September 12, in which plaintiff's counsel again 
objected to the lack of notice, the trial court granted summary 
judgment for the defendant. 
On appeal, the plaintiff once again contended that he was 
deprived of adequate opportunity to oppose the motion. The 
defendant conceded that its motion for summary judgment did not 
comply with Rule 56(c), but urged that the trial court's decision 
be affirmed on the ground that the plaintiff could not demonstrate 
prejudice. In reversing and remanding the trial court's granting 
of summary judgment, the Second Circuit noted that the harmless 
error rule should not apply to motions for summary judgment filed 
on the eve of trial: 
In Winbourne v. Eastern Airlines, 632 F.2d 
219 (2d Cir. 1980), we expressed a 
preference for strict adherence to the ten-
day rule, noting that the opposing party 
must be allowed "adequate opportunity" to 
respond. While we may have left the door 
open for application of a harmless error 
rule, ic3. at 223 n. 6, we believe that the 
use of such a rule must be limited to 
extraordinary cases in which the ten-day 
notice is impractical, and it is absolutely 
clear that the non-moving party suffered no 
prejudice from a shortening of the period. 
This follows we believed from the non-moving 
party's burden of production and the need 
for time to marshall and prepare documents 
indicating the presence of a disputed 
factual issue. Since preparation of papers 
to oppose a motion for summary judgment may 
differ materially from preparation for 
trial, the better practice is to establish 
discovery schedules which allow such motions 
to be made and considered prior to the trial 
date and simply to deny motions which do not 
afford the necessary notice. 
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* * * 
The fact that this case was scheduled 
for trial on September 12 is not cause for 
shortening the ten-day period on the grounds 
that the appellant's evidence had to be 
marshalled within the shorter period anyway. 
Opposition to the motion for summary judgment 
required the preparation and execution of 
documents by the 12th, tasks considerably 
different from summoning witnesses for oral 
testimony at a trial beginning on the 12th. 
It may be, therefore, that granting either 
more time to prepare opposition to the 
motion or going ahead with the trial would 
have led to a different result in the 
instant case. 
We believe that where a party claims an 
inability to prepare adequate opposition to 
a motion for summary judgment within a 
shortened response period, the non-moving 
party must be afforded the full response 
period mandated by Rule 56(c), absent reason 
to believe that that claim is demonstrably 
frivolous. 
Id. at 95-96 (emphasis added). 
Numerous courts have found prejudice to be inherent where 
motions for summary judgment are filed on the eve of trial and 
where adequate time to respond is not given. See Management 
Investors v. United Mine Workers of America, 610 F.2d 384, 388-89 
(6th Cir. 1979); Ailshire v. Darnell, 508 F.2d 526, 528 (8th Cir. 
1974); and Mustang Fuel Corp. v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 480 
F.2d 607 (10th Cir. 1973). 
The potential for prejudice to a party from last minute 
motions for summary judgment is also reflected in Rule 4(d) of the 
Rules of Practice of the Third Judicial District Court. Rule 4(d) 
governs the instant case, and clearly is intended to discourage and 
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restrict the filing of motions for summary judgment on the eve of 
trial. Rule 4(d) provides: 
All motions for summary judgment or other 
dispositive motions must be heard at least 
thirty (30) days before the day set for 
trial. No such motion shall be heard after 
that date without leave of court. 
The lack of adequate notice and time to respond was 
particularly prejudicial to Fire Insurance Exchange in the instant 
case. At the hearing on the bank's motion for summary judgment, 
counsel for Rocky Mountain States Bank reviewed for the court the 
circumstances surrounding their settlement with the plaintiffs and 
the subsequent filing of the motion for summary judgment on Friday, 
May 22, 1986. (Summary Judgment Transcript, at 3-5). Trial 
counsel for Fire Insurance Exchange immediately objected to the 
notice and timing of the motion: 
Mr. Roybal: Well, your Honor, the unfortu-
nate thing about this particular aspect of 
this case is the timing. It is very diffi-
cult for all parties to take the position on 
it. Number 1, I have not had time to go 
through the memorandum and research the 
issues that the bank has raised relative to 
whether contribution and indemnity go to 
anything other than purely negligence, but I 
will submit to the court that under Rule 
56(c), I must be given at least ten days 
notice before the hearing is set to respond 
to a motion for summary judgment, which is 
what the bank has filed, is a motion for 
summary judgment. 
I have not been given that, and on that 
ground alone, I think the court should not 
require me to even respond in any way, shape 
or form to it, and should the bank take the 
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position that this is a motion to dismiss 
rather than a motion for summary judgment, 
Rule 2.7(b) of the Rules of Practice in the 
district and circuit court also require at 
least five days1 notice prior to the notice 
of hearing which I have not had. 
(Summary Judgment Transcript, at 5-6). 
The improper timing of the bank's motion was also 
acknowledged by counsel for both the plaintiffs and the bank. 
(Summary Judgment Transcript, at 4, 7, and 8). The trial court 
noted Fire Insurance Exchange's objection to the notice and timing 
of the motion for summary judgment, but ruled as follows: 
I am of the view that in light of the 
exigent circumstances that have now been 
prompted principally by the result of the 
settlement that the opportunity to respond, 
as provided in the Rules, can be and should 
be appropriately be waived in light of what 
I deem to be no showing of unfair prejudice 
to a party, and, accordingly, the notice 
requirement is waived. It is my judgment 
that being Tuesday, there has been some ade-
quate or at least available time within 
which Mr. Roybal, the memorandum, which is 
not lengthy in this matter, could have been 
reviewed and an argument at least presented 
to this court as to what additional theories 
you thought might be appropriate or what 
evidence might be appropriate to allow you 
to assert a cross-claim for contribution or 
indemnity. 
Therefore, it is my view, counsel, in 
light of the settlement that's been effected 
and the arguments that have been presented 
here, that the motion for summary judgment 
is granted, and I think that, too, in light 
of what appears to me to be a very slim, if 
any, likelihood of any basis for asserting a 
cross-claim or indemntification against the 
bank that serves merely to unduly prolong 
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these proceedings and the issues that the 
jury will have to consider, in any event. 
So the bank's motion is granted. 
(Summary Judgment Transcript, at 13). Following the court's 
ruling, counsel for Fire Insurance Exchange moved for a 
continuance in order to prepare a possible third-party complaint 
against the defendant bank. (Summary Judgment Transcript, at 14). 
The motion to continue was denied. (Summary Judgment Transcript, 
at 19) . 
In choosing to act as it did on the bank's motion for 
summary judgment, the trial court disposed of a complex case 
without even permitting Fire Insurance Exchange the benefits of 
applicable procedural rules. Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure should have allowed Fire Insurance Exchange at least ten 
days after the motion for summary judgment was served to respond. 
Similarly, local Rule 4(d) should have prohibited the filing of 
such a motion on the very eve of trial. In this case, however, the 
motion was not served upon Fire Insurance Exchange's counsel until 
late in the evening of Friday, May 22, 1986. Hearing on the motion 
was held on the next business day, the same day previously set for 
the beginning of a six-day trial. Counsel for Fire Insurance 
Exchange objected to the timing and the lack of notice of the 
defendant bank's motion. Counsel requested additional time to 
respond to the motion. Although the court heard argument on the 
motion and in that sense granted a hearing, the hearing was little 
more than an empty gesture since counsel for Fire Insurance 
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Exchange had been effectively deprived of his opportunity to 
respond to the motion. 
Both the Constitution of the State of Utah and the United 
States Constitution guarantee due process of law. U.S. Const. 
Amend. XIV, §1, and Utah Const. Art. I, §7. The Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure and the local Rules of Practice define what minimum 
procedural safeguards are due in a given circumstance. The trial 
court's refusal to require strict compliance with the notice and 
time limitations of those rules, after counsel objected and 
requested additional time to respond, prejudiced Fire Insurance 
Exchange and denied defendant its due process right to be heard. 
See Management Investors v. United Mine Workers of America, 610 
F.2d 384, 390 (6th Cir. 1979). Defendant Fire Insurance Exchange 
respectfully submits that the trial court's actions in entertaining 
and granting the motion for summary judgment after less than five 
days' notice and on the eve of trial constitutes reversible error. 
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